

AD-B168 450


②

NATO's Future Role in Europe


**Toward a More Political Alliance
in a Stable "1½ Bloc" System**

Richard L. Kugler

DTIC
ELECTE
NOV 13 1992
S A D

RAND

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF PAGES WHICH DO NOT REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

The research described in this report was supported by The Ford Foundation under Grant No. 840-0289A.

ISBN: 0-8330-1055-7

The RAND Publication Series: The Report is the principal publication documenting and transmitting RAND's major research findings and final research results. The RAND Note reports other outputs of sponsored research for general distribution. Publications of The RAND Corporation do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the sponsors of RAND research.

Published by The RAND Corporation
1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90406-2138

ERRATUM

R-3923-FF NATO's Future Role in Europe

Toward a More Political Alliance in a Stable
"1½ Bloc" System, by Richard L. Kugler, May 1990

Page iii (Preface)

The third sentence in this paragraph should read

This study was completed in late February 1990.

PUBLICATIONS
DEPARTMENT

THE **RAND**
CORPORATION

R-3923-FF

NATO's Future Role in Europe

**Toward a More Political Alliance
in a Stable "1½ Bloc" System**

Richard L. Kugler

May 1990

Supported by
The Ford Foundation

RAND

92-29468



92 11 12 112

PREFACE

This study on alternative futures for NATO was supported by a grant from The Ford Foundation. It is one of a series of studies being done by The RAND Corporation on this subject. This study was completed in late February 1989. Although the pace of current events will soon make some details obsolete, this study's enduring contribution is intended to lie in the conceptual framework developed for thinking about NATO's policies in the years ahead. The issues raised and the framework developed should remain relevant for some time. It should be of interest to anyone concerned about NATO's future, but especially U.S. and allied government officials who are working on NATO.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 4

| | |
|---------------|-------|
| Accession For | |
| NTIS CRASH | J |
| DTIC TAB | |
| Unannounced | |
| Justification | |
| By | |
| Distribution/ | |
| Availability | |
| Dist | Avail |
| 12 | |

"DTIC USERS ONLY"

SUMMARY

This study analyzes, individually and interactively, the major variables that seem likely to shape NATO's role over the period 1990-2005. Among the factors are NATO's present structure and options for changing it, U.S. and West European goals, the dynamics of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the future course of West European integration, the role of military forces, and the future of Germany. The analysis suggests conceptual guidelines for charting a sound course for NATO as part of the West's efforts to construct a stable security architecture in Europe.

The conditions under which the West could entirely dismantle NATO and the act of identifying them illustrate why this alliance is likely to live on. NATO could be completely dissolved if the Soviet Union were to become a permanently benign nation, if European nations were to achieve such a high degree of consensus that war among them became unimaginable, and if the transatlantic relationship no longer required a formal alliance to cement it. These conditions are not beyond the realm of possibility, but they are unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future. NATO's premature dissolution could unleash forces of instability in Europe. At worst, it could produce a multipolar system, with an isolationist United States, an expansionist Soviet Union, and a neutral Germany divided from Britain and France. History suggests that this system would be prone to tension and possible disorder. To prevent this deterioration and to guide Europe through the dangerous times ahead, NATO will need to remain as a foundation of the West's security policy for some time.

The NATO alliance is more than a response to the Cold War and the Soviet Union's military presence in Eastern Europe. It serves vital Western interests that transcend the specific details of East-West relations. It brings the United States into Europe's affairs on a daily basis, thereby preventing the isolationism that contributed to the outbreak of war in 1914 and 1939. NATO also creates mutual commitments that help bind the transatlantic community of nations, a community united by economics and common values as well as by security needs. Finally, NATO exists to provide extended deterrence to nations that would remain vulnerable to nuclear blackmail even if Soviet troops left Eastern Europe. These strategic purposes and the policy goals that flow from them create powerful reasons for maintaining a cohesive alliance. Unless these functions become unnecessary, the West will continue needing NATO in some form.

As long as NATO continues to face a Soviet military threat of some sort, it will need a coherent military strategy and defense posture, albeit with smaller forces than those of today. NATO's present strategy of forward defense and flexible response (MC 14/3) is particularly intended to protect exposed allied borders and to reduce the risk of premature escalation in a crisis. This strategy reflects the vital interests of the United States and its allies, and it is aimed at supporting deterrence, defense, alliance unity, nonproliferation, and crisis stability. In future years, specific aspects of MC 14/3 (for example, the geographic focal point of forward defense) will probably mutate as Europe evolves. As long as a Soviet military threat continues to exist in some form, however, MC 14/3's core features are unlikely to change because the alternatives—enhanced reliance on nuclear deterrence or “no first use” of nuclear weapons—are unpalatable. Given this continuity in strategy, NATO will continue to require a “triad” force posture of strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces, and conventional forces to support MC 14/3's operational concepts of direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response.

NATO has always relied on strong American leadership. As their economies slowly grow, the West European allies might prove increasingly able and willing to absorb many of the military functions now performed by U.S. military forces in Europe. This will permit a partial U.S. drawdown as Soviet forces are withdrawn from Eastern Europe. However, Western Europe is unlikely to form an independent security pillar soon, especially an effective coalition that could entirely replace NATO and eliminate Western Europe's reliance on the United States. What holds true for Western Europe is doubly true for Germany, regardless of when reunification is achieved.

Given the profound changes at work, this is no time for stagnation on NATO's part. What is needed is a process of change and adaptation, one aimed at transforming NATO from its primarily military orientation into a more “political” alliance. This does not mean that the proper response to a hollow Warsaw Pact is an equivalently hollow NATO, which would produce a power vacuum and instability in Europe. A more “political” alliance means that NATO should broaden its traditional preoccupation with achieving military deterrence at the inter-German border against the backdrop of an unchanging bloc-to-bloc conflict between democracy and communism. NATO should focus its policy on achieving political stability and equilibrium throughout all of Europe in a less confrontational but more complicated and fluid security system. This policy will still require substantial military strength, but an equally important feature will be an adept diplomacy.

The road ahead thus calls for a policy of pragmatic aims rather than ultimate visions, one concerned with managing the power of still-competing nations rather than banishing political conflict altogether. The dimensions of the challenge are illustrated by Table S.1, which sketches one evolutionary path that Europe conceivably might follow over the next 15 years. On the horizontal axis are displayed five different European security systems (A through E), along with their characteristics. The central thesis is that Europe is likely to pass progressively from one system to the next. It might settle at one system along the way (or even reverse course), but it might complete the entire journey. The goal of Western security policy would be to use NATO to enhance stability at each stage, to guard against reversals, and to encourage further evolution until the process is completed. These five security systems, of course, are heuristic and do not exhaust the range of possibilities or imply an automatic sequence of events. They are useful for thinking about Europe's future because they help span the spectrum of uncertainty, and a different kind of NATO alliance is required for dealing with each of them.

The United States is assumed to maintain a political-military presence in Europe, but the West European allies are projected to acquire a larger capacity to meet NATO's conventional force requirements in Central Europe. Meanwhile, the European Community is projected to grow steadily and to expand to include members of the European Free Trade Association and possibly Eastern Europe. Additionally, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is projected to grow in stature, scope, and mission. Given these changes, one of the important tasks facing the West would be to alter NATO internally in adjusting to Western Europe's growing strength. Similarly, NATO's policies would need to be harmonized with those of the European Community and the CSCE.

Each security system would be rendered more stable by a cohesive NATO. But stage D, which might linger for several years, would not be a highly stable system even if NATO remains in existence as a cohesive alliance mainly because of a resurgence of tensions within Eastern Europe supplemented by potential conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western nations over political-economic developments and security conditions there. This problem is presumed to disappear only several years later in stage E, where the Soviet Union comes to terms with the West and the new security conditions in Europe.

The West's objective should be to arrive at stage E, but this visionary goal will not be achieved for many years, if then. Given Western interests and the trends at work in Europe, this study concludes that the West would be advised to concentrate most

Table S.1
FUTURE STAGES IN EUROPE'S EVOLUTION

| System | Stage | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Time horizon (years) | Through 1989 | 1-3 | 2-5 | 3-7 | 5-15 |
| Status of Germany | Divided | Unified | Unified | Unified | Unified |
| Status of Soviet forces | Large deployments | Reduced to post-CFE levels | Withdrawn except from Poland | Withdrawn entirely | Withdrawn entirely |
| Status of Warsaw Pact | Surface cohesion | Eroded cohesion | Hollow | Dismantled | USSR not a major adversary |
| Status of other institutions | | | | | |
| • EC | Steady economic growth, slow political integration, expansion into EFTA and Eastern Europe | | | | |
| • CSCE | Slow, steady expansion of regulatory role | | | | |
| Foundation of system architecture | | | | | |
| • Cohesive NATO | — | Bipolar | Muted bipolar | 1-1/2 bloc | Collective security |
| • Decreasingly cohesive NATO | Bipolar | Bipolar | Muted bipolar | Multipolar | Collective security |
| System stability | | | | | |
| • Cohesive NATO | Low/medium | Medium | Medium/high | Medium/low | Very high |
| • Decreasingly cohesive NATO | — | Medium/low | Medium/low | Low | High |

immediately on managing the transition to a stable stage D, the "1-1/2 bloc" system. This will involve:

- The withdrawal of all Soviet military forces behind the USSR's borders, but a Soviet Union that remains a potentially adversarial power.
- Reunification of Germany with continued membership in NATO.
- The eventual withdrawal of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East European nations from the Warsaw Pact.

Managing the transition to stage D will require taking the major step of Germany's reunification even as the Soviet Union parts company with the security buffer that has been a central feature of its policy since World War II. Once stage D is achieved, the task of maintaining the new system's stability will be equally difficult since this system could be prone to tension as the European Community's influence spreads into Eastern Europe. Tension will be exacerbated if the Soviet Union is beset with internal troubles, a stagnant economy, a sense of outside encirclement, and fears for the future. None of this necessarily adds up to tranquil times ahead.

If the transition to stage D is to be managed successfully, the CSCE will have to acquire a larger capacity to regulate the military forces and diplomatic conduct of all participants. But the CSCE itself is likely to grow only in a slow and steady way, and its effectiveness is likely to be shaped by the degree to which an underlying consensus exists in Europe. Without a political accord that accepts the new security system as legitimate, CSCE alone is not a workable solution.

Similar constraints apply to the idea of using the European Community as a security substitute for NATO. Present trends suggest that as a product of the 1992 project, the European Community will very likely propel Western Europe toward greater economic and political integration in the years ahead. To the extent that the European Community pursues a "broadening" of its scope (as opposed to internal "deepening"), it can help foster economic development and political democratization in Eastern Europe. However, the European Community is likely to continue maturing only slowly and steadily, not fast enough to compensate for any precipitous dismantling of NATO. Equally important, the European Community is an economic and political institution, not a security alliance. It relies on NATO to perform the security function, and it could not readily be transformed into a security alliance if NATO were to disappear. Also, the European Community does not include the United States and therefore would lack the important

assets that U.S. membership brings to NATO. Finally, the European Community itself ultimately might prove to be a cause of instability if it expands into Eastern Europe in ways that provoke Soviet opposition. This study concludes that the West will need to retain and actively employ NATO as a primary institutional vehicle for forging a coherent security policy aimed at creating a stable 1-1/2 bloc system.

In the scheme developed here, there are five security "requirements" for safely achieving stage D and then ensuring this system's stability once it is achieved; all five call for a cohesive, diplomatically active NATO. The first requirement is that the pace of change in Europe should be controlled, if possible, to achieve a proper orchestration of events. In particular, the rush to German reunification, if accompanied by premature Polish and Czechoslovakian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, could trigger a Soviet-military clampdown that might lead to a Soviet-NATO confrontation. Political change in Europe might outpace the emergence of new security institutions and structures to contain it. At least until an alignment between new realities and new architectures is achieved, NATO will be needed to help preserve a stable security system.

A second requirement is that properly coordinated diplomatic policies should be pursued that work together to open the way to further progress. The West's goal should be to orchestrate the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Eastern Europe without entering into arrangements that unacceptably harm the West's own interests. NATO provides the best available institution for achieving the required coordination.

A third requirement for a successful transition is achievement of an acceptable solution to the German "problem." The interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations must be protected, but the legitimate needs of Germany must be respected, too. Although several European nations have expressed nervousness about any quick joining of the two Germanies, the rapidly accelerating drive to unification within Germany is a political and moral imperative, one that has been an acknowledged Western goal for many years.

Debate over reunification began intensifying in the aftermath of Kohl's speech in November 1989. It was evidently intended to lay out a responsible Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) position. The Soviet Union immediately objected to the Kohl plan, and particularly denounced any implication that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) would disappear or that a reunited Germany could remain within NATO. Shortly afterward, the four-power control commission for Berlin issued a cautionary statement underlining its rights in determining Berlin's future. In a similar vein, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called for a slow reunification process, lasting 10-15

years, to finish only after substantially greater West European integration and accommodation with the Soviet Union have taken place. Speaking for the United States, President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker then put forward four principles for reunification:

1. Self-determination without prejudice to the outcome.
2. Within the framework of continued membership in NATO and within the European Community.
3. Through a step-by-step process.
4. German respect for present international borders.

Gorbachev's dramatic endorsement of reunification in late January 1990 propelled developments a giant step forward. With agreement to initiate "six-power" talks on reunification, a broad European consensus seemed to be emerging on two points: that NATO's forces should not enter East Germany after unification and that a unified Germany should be embedded in a larger security architecture that preserves stability.

Meanwhile, events within Germany itself have been propelling both states toward reunification within a shorter time than outside powers would prefer. Common economic policies and a common currency lie ahead. Formal political discussions have begun, and the GDR's move to free elections has led to the establishment of political parties there strongly resembling their FRG counterparts. Thus, the pace of change in both Germanies seemingly is making unification inevitable within a very short time.

Reunification gives rise to the question of whether Germany should remain as a member of either bloc. The West's interests and Europe's stability would be best served if the new Germany were to remain a member of NATO. Germany's withdrawal from NATO would result in a weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in the face of a still-existing Soviet nuclear threat. Germany's nuclear requirements could not readily be met by U.K. and French forces, especially since withdrawal from NATO would attenuate Germany's ties with those nations as well as the EC's cohesion. Short of the speedy (and unlikely) creation of a West European military alliance to replace NATO, Germany would be compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent and to pursue an independent foreign policy and defense policy aimed at buffering itself against the Soviet Union. The result would be the kind of political tensions that could make stage D unmanageable.

A fourth requirement for stability is that a reunited Germany must pose no threat to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The transition of the Warsaw Pact from a hollow alliance to complete dismantlement thus

must be accompanied by appropriate security guarantees to these nations regarding Germany's military forces and the preservation of present borders. NATO provides the best institutional framework for making such guarantees credible. Guarantees from NATO ensuring that Poland and Czechoslovakia will refrain from security ties that could draw Western military forces toward the USSR's borders will be needed to induce Soviet military withdrawal and Soviet acceptance of the new security system. Anything less could stall the transition process, freeze it altogether, or cause a rebirth of the Cold War with control over Poland being the issue at stake.

In a similar vein, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as presumably democratic nations with growing economic ties to the West, would require security guarantees against aggression from the Soviet Union. Beyond doubt, the need to provide Western assurances to Eastern Europe poses troublesome implications for the stability of the 1-1/2 bloc system that will require careful diplomatic management. An appropriate Western policy would call on NATO to remain in the background and to function only as an instrument of last resort.

The fifth requirement for a stable stage D is a more productive Western relationship with the Soviet Union. An expansion of Western economic ties, along with appropriate security guarantees that NATO could best provide, would help give the Soviet Union a stake in maintaining the stability of this security system. Even in the best of circumstances, of course, the West will be able only to influence, not control, the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

In these ways, a more politically oriented NATO could help guide the transition process through stages B and C, and then to help underwrite the European security architecture of stage D. No other institution in existence or likely to be created could perform these security functions as well as NATO.

Table S.2 illuminates how the West might guide NATO into becoming a less military, more political alliance over the coming 15 years. NATO's layers include, from bottom to top, the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO's military organization, the transatlantic bargain that assigns roles to individual members, alliance military strategy, and NATO's force posture. By changing NATO's structure on any one or more of these layers, a new, better attuned alliance can be created. In the process, unnecessary features can be cast off and appropriate adjustments made. NATO would become a dynamically evolving alliance that adapts itself intelligently to the changing scene in Europe.

By stage D, NATO's conventional forces are cut by nearly one-half. Nonetheless, NATO retains large forces. Despite large Soviet force cuts and the eventual withdrawal of the East European nations from

Table S.2

FUTURE EVOLUTION OF NATO, 1990-2005

| System | Stage | | | | |
|---|---|---------|---------|-------|---|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Layer 5 Altered military forces Theater nuclear posture | Present | Reduced | Reduced | Small | Symbolic |
| Conventional posture (percent) | | | | | |
| Deployed | 100 | 80-90 | 60-67 | 44-60 | 40-55 |
| Reinforced | 100 | 89-90 | 70-80 | 60-65 | 50-60 |
| Division of labor (percent of total) | | | | | |
| Allied | 55 | 60 | 64 | 64 | 64 |
| U.S. | 45 | 50 | 36 | 36 | 36 |
| U.S. force presence in Europe | | | | | |
| Division | 5-1/3 | 4-1/3 | 3 | 1-3 | 1-2 |
| TFW | 8 | 6 | 6 | 3-5 | 2-4 |
| Layer 4 Altered military strategy Extended deterrence Flexible response Forward defense | | | | | Unchanged Less reliance on nuclear escalation Broadened forward defense and regional security |
| Layer 3 Altered Transatlantic Bargain | | | | | |
| | Gradual transition to greater allied role | | | | |
| | Slow U.S. drawdown to small enduring presence | | | | |
| Layer 2 Altered military organization | | | | | Gradual scaleback to altered structure |
| Layer 1 Altered North Atlantic Treaty Remains in force at least until "Concert of Europe" emerges (post 2005) | | | | | |

the Warsaw Pact, a sizable Soviet military threat would remain in existence. NATO would require military forces to maintain its unity, to project a peacetime image of strength in Europe, and to guard against a reversal of events, including Soviet violation of arms control accords. At stage D, NATO would need to continue to plan against the contingency of a Soviet reentry into Eastern Europe followed by an attack on Germany. Even in stage E the West's role in maintaining a collective security system would require NATO's nations to consider the possibility of helping East European nations defend against a Soviet attack on Poland or other countries.

NATO's military strategy could be altered somewhat but not relegated to an unimportant position in alliance policy. The extended deterrence and flexible response parts of MC 14/3 would need to remain in force. The most important change is a replacement of forward defense at the old inter-German border with a concept that defends a unified Germany in wartime. Like NATO's strategy today, this mission would require a capacity to respond to a broad range of crises as well as the ability to conduct a direct conventional defense and to escalate in a deliberate way.

As the 1990s unfold, the Western European allies gradually could assume a larger role in providing NATO's military forces by taking proportionately smaller cuts than U.S. forces. In the present stage A, the United States provides about 16 percent of NATO's peacetime forces in Central Europe and 45 percent of its fully mobilized forces in wartime. By stage D, as envisioned here, the U.S. contribution could shrink to about 10 percent in peacetime and 35 percent in wartime. A new division of labor would place a larger share of the burden on the shoulders of the increasingly prosperous allies. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces are never entirely withdrawn from the continent and the United States would retain an important reinforcing role. Even in stage E, a symbolic force of one U.S. division and two tactical fighter wings remain deployed in Germany, small formations might be deployed elsewhere in Europe, and sizable forces in the United States would remain oriented to Europe.

Finally, the NATO alliance, along with its integrated military organization (in altered form), would remain in existence throughout. In stage D, NATO continues to provide the foundation for the West's security in the 1-1/2 bloc system, even as the European Community and the CSCE grow in importance. In stage E, a less politically dominant NATO continues to exist as part of a collective security system, under CSCE's auspices, in which a largely reformed Soviet Union is a responsible participant. The need for NATO perhaps might disappear when the kind of "Concert of Europe" is achieved that renders war and

political conflict too improbable to be taken seriously. Until then, this study concludes, NATO will need to be retained, albeit in altered form, as an important instrument of the West's statecraft in Europe.

CONTENTS

| | |
|--|-----|
| PREFACE | iii |
| SUMMARY | v |
| TABLES | xix |
| Section | |
| I. INTRODUCTION | 1 |
| II. THE PRESENT NATO ALLIANCE SYSTEM AND OPTIONS FOR DISMANTLEMENT | 4 |
| The North Atlantic Treaty | 4 |
| The NATO Organization | 5 |
| The Transatlantic Bargain and the Paris Agreement | 6 |
| NATO's Military Strategy | 7 |
| NATO's Triad Military Posture | 9 |
| NATO's Force Posture: 1990 | 9 |
| III. VARIABLES AFFECTING FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO | 14 |
| U.S. Policy and Presence in Europe | 14 |
| The West's Goals and Security Policy in Europe | 17 |
| Trends in West European Integration | 27 |
| Trends in the Soviet Bloc | 31 |
| Future Evolution of the European Security System, 1990-2005 | 35 |
| IV. GAINS AND LOSSES OF DISMANTLING NATO | 42 |
| Dismantlement Option 1: Reduction of NATO's Forces . | 45 |
| Dismantlement Option 2: Altered NATO Military Strategy | 52 |
| Dismantlement Option 3: Altered Transatlantic Bargain | 63 |
| Dismantlement Options 4 and 5: Eliminating NATO as a Political Alliance | 70 |
| V. THE PATH TOWARD A MORE POLITICAL, LESS MILITARY NATO ALLIANCE | 75 |

TABLES

| | | |
|------|--|------|
| S.1. | Future stages in Europe's evolution | viii |
| S.2. | Future evolution of NATO, 1990-2005 | xiii |
| 1. | Future dismantlement options for NATO | 12 |
| 2. | Changes required by each dismantlement option | 13 |
| 3. | Future stages in Europe's evolution | 36 |
| 4. | Future evolution of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact military threat, 1990-2005 | 62 |
| 5. | Current division-equivalents in Central Europe | 64 |
| 6. | NATO's force requirements | 64 |
| 7. | Future division of labor | 65 |
| 8. | NATO's defense posture after allied cuts | 66 |
| 9. | Future evolution of NATO, 1990-2005 | 83 |
| 10. | Future evolution of NATO's military requirements, 1990-2005 | 86 |

I. INTRODUCTION

In his 1989 speech at Guildhall, former President Reagan suggested that because of changes now underway in Europe, the time might come when the Western nations no longer will need to maintain their present NATO military alliance there. This study takes a cue from Reagan's provocative comment and from the political upheaval taking place in the Soviet bloc and Germany. It examines the role of the NATO alliance in a future European security system. Most immediately involved here are NATO's military superstructure, including its formal organization, defense strategy, and force posture. But also potentially involved are the alliance's political foundations, including the commitment to collective security that unites its members and the North Atlantic Treaty itself.

The West is already pursuing a form of "dismantling" of NATO by participating in arms control negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear and conventional forces on both sides. Any move beyond this step, however, would mark a major departure from official Western policy. At the May 1989 Brussels summit, NATO's political leaders reaffirmed their view that NATO must remain alive and active for the foreseeable future.

NATO was not originally envisioned as a permanent alliance. It was established in an era when the Soviet Union was pursuing an expansionist course and the West European nations, beset with economic chaos and internal instability, were too weak to protect themselves. NATO's creators believed that an alliance was vitally necessary, but they also saw NATO as a temporary expedient that could be disbanded once the situation in Europe had stabilized. As events turned out, the stabilization process has taken a good deal longer than originally expected, but the conditions that led to NATO's creation finally seem to be changing enough that the Europe of the future might be dramatically different from the past.

The passing of the Cold War does not automatically mean that NATO should fade from the scene. The alliance has paid its members major strategic dividends over the past four decades, and the changes now taking place in Europe are due in no small measure to NATO's existence. The task for the future will be one of constructing a new, more stable European security architecture, which will need to protect the West's vital interests, to manage stresses and conflicts, to deter the outbreak of crises, and to help pave the way toward more productive

East-West relations and reform within the Soviet bloc. In all likelihood, collective security and military forces will remain important elements in the West's efforts to build this kind of architecture. To the extent that is the case, NATO might well have a continuing role to play as a hedge against the Cold War's return and as a positive instrument of Western policy in the coming era.

Now that the Cold War is ending, what role should NATO play in the West's security policy in the 1990s and beyond? Will the new conditions emerging in Europe permit the West to safely dismantle NATO and thereby to cast off the burdens of coalition membership and military preparedness? If so, to what degree? Alternatively, will NATO continue to be needed as an instrument of Western statecraft for guiding change and preserving stability in Europe? If so, how should NATO be altered internally and what policies should it pursue toward the East? What should be NATO's military strategy and force posture? What form should NATO take and what tasks should it perform in the European security architecture of the era ahead? To what degree should NATO evolve from a primarily military coalition into a more political alliance, one that concentrates less on defense issues and more on the management of broader European security affairs?

These issues can be decided only on the basis of thorough analysis that takes into account not only what is being discarded, but also what is being created in its place. The issues are very complex and interconnected in ways that may not be obvious at first glance. Often, concepts that seem attractive fade once the necessary conditions, tradeoffs, and consequences are fully understood. Also, proper solutions may be counterintuitive and their merits not readily apparent until the details are examined closely.

This study is intended to help in this regard by examining the issues surrounding NATO's future roles and missions in the rapidly changing European security environment. It explores the key arguments both for and against NATO's perpetuation. In the process, it seeks to identify functions that NATO no longer might need to perform. But it also endeavors to clarify old duties that should be carried forward and new tasks that possibly should be picked up. It thus has a positive agenda, as well as a negative one. While it defines the conditions under which NATO might be partially dismantled, it also identifies the circumstances in which NATO should continue to exist, to change, and even to grow.

This study examines a period several years in the future, far enough ahead to make present trends felt but not so distant as to make long-range forecasting hopelessly speculative. Although Europe clearly is in the throes of an important transformation, the outcome is not yet in

sight. Indeed, one can imagine a future in which NATO will not be needed at all, or one in which NATO's mission will remain largely unchanged, or somewhere in between. Much depends on how the Soviet Union and Europe as a whole will evolve, a subject about which even seasoned observers confess uncertainty. This study bases its analysis not on any one future forecast but on several alternative European security systems that might come to pass. It then seeks to determine the kind of NATO alliance that would be appropriate for each case. It attempts to distinguish the likely from the improbable, but in a manner that neither sacrifices comprehensiveness nor forecloses critical judgments.

Section II describes the present NATO alliance system and outlines several alternatives for dismantling it partly or entirely. Section III examines in some detail five variables that seem likely to affect future requirements for NATO and the attitudes of member nations toward this alliance:

- U.S. policy and presence in Europe.
- The West's political-military goals and objectives.
- Trends in West European integration.
- Developments within the Soviet bloc.
- Future changes in the European security system and architecture.

Based on the analysis of these variables, Sec. IV presents a cost-benefit analysis that examines options for altering and dismantling NATO in various ways, particularly by reducing its military forces and changing its military strategy. Section V combines the results of Secs. II-IV by outlining a future transitional path for Western security policy and NATO that is aimed at producing a new, stable European security system anchored on the complete withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe and the preservation of a more political, less military NATO alliance.

II. THE PRESENT NATO ALLIANCE SYSTEM AND OPTIONS FOR DISMANTLEMENT

Beyond doubt, the NATO alliance today is an elaborate institution, one that spans both sides of the Atlantic. It stretches from Norway on the northern flank to Turkey and Greece on the southern flank. NATO can best be portrayed for present purposes as being composed of five separate but interrelated layers. NATO's foundation is the North Atlantic Treaty and the political commitment to collective security that it represents. On the second layer is the NATO organization, including NATO's civilian headquarters and its military command structure. Next comes the "transatlantic bargain," as embodied in the 1954 Paris Agreement, which establishes the military responsibilities for the United States, West Germany, and the other allies in the critical Central Region. The fourth layer is NATO's military strategy of "flexible response," which specifies how NATO's forces are to be structured and employed to achieve alliance security objectives. Finally comes NATO's "triad" force posture, including the alliance's large strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.¹

THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

The treaty, signed in 1949, is a fairly short document of 14 articles. Its preamble notes that the member nations have a common heritage of freedom, democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. With a view to developing this heritage, Article 2 commits member nations to work together to develop "peaceful and friendly international relations" by strengthening their free institutions, by "promoting conditions of stability and well-being," by seeking to "eliminate conflict in their economic policies," and by encouraging "economic collaboration between any or all of them." With these clauses, the treaty establishes the important principle that NATO is more than just a military alliance.

Within this framework, Articles 3-5 establish the collective security foundation for the alliance. Article 3 commits the parties, separately and jointly, to maintain an individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack by means of continuous and effective self-help and

¹For further information on NATO's structure and history see *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: Facts and Figures*, NATO Information Service, Brussels, 1984.

mutual aid. Article 4 instructs the parties to "consult together" whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the parties is threatened. Article 5, the key provision, states that the parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them "shall be considered an attack against them all." In the event of such an attack, Article 5 states, the parties will take such action as deemed necessary, "including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

The remaining articles primarily are very general guidelines on implementing the alliance. By not specifying the exact kind of alliance that is to be built, they give NATO's members a clean slate to write on. Over the years, this latitude has provided the legal authority for a steady stream of decisions to build an increasingly elaborate structure that goes well beyond what many of the treaty's authors originally envisioned. But there is also ample room for scaling NATO back without sacrificing the treaty itself.

THE NATO ORGANIZATION

The North Atlantic Treaty itself did not establish an integrated organization. It mandated only creation of a council and a "defense committee" to implement the treaty and left organizational development to further study. NATO initially responded to this charter by creating a loosely structured alliance bearing little resemblance to the present version. This began to change in 1950, especially after the outbreak of the Korean War galvanized NATO's members into action. During 1950-1951, the North Atlantic Council, the NATO international civilian staff, the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) under command of a U.S. general officer, and Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) were all established. The following year, NATO's other military commands were created. With these steps, the alliance had created the framework of the elaborate organizational structure that exists today, with political headquarters in Belgium and military command staffs scattered across Europe and the United States.

The NATO organization currently performs a wide range of important functions. At NATO's apex is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), composed of heads of government from each nation or their representatives, which sets overall alliance policy. Supporting the NAC are the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), composed of civilian defense ministers from each nation, and the Military Committee, which is made up of the chiefs of staff of each nation. Subject to NAC approval, the

DPC and the Military Committee, drawing on supporting staffs at NATO and SHAPE, establish defense plans and policies for the alliance. Wartime control of NATO's forces would be executed through a complex structure composed of three major commands: Allied Command Europe (ACE), under SACEUR; Allied Command Atlantic, under SACLANC; and Allied Command Channel, under CINCHAN. Although these commands have operational control of few forces in peacetime, they play the important role of preparing NATO's operational plans, doctrines, and tactics.

The net effect is to make NATO a truly integrated military structure, one that exerts major influence over the defense activities of each member nation. Through its "force goals" process, NATO attempts to guide the peacetime defense programs of all alliance participants. This extends to the point of influencing specific decisions over national force levels and modernization plans, as well as training and exercise programs. In wartime, each member's forces would come under NATO's command and would operate together on behalf of the common good rather than parent nation interests. The goal is to ensure that NATO can fight effectively as an integrated coalition, rather than as a loose collection of sovereign nations. Apart from the Warsaw Pact, no other modern alliance has attempted this level of combined planning, much less achieved it to this degree.

THE TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN AND THE PARIS AGREEMENT

Shortly after the treaty was signed in 1949, NATO's members agreed on a "strategic concept" that allocated defense missions according to a "division of labor" philosophy. The United States was assigned responsibility for nuclear operations and, along with Great Britain, defense of the North Atlantic seelanes. Defense of the European landmass was assigned to the continental allies, with the United States and Britain to help as appropriate. This approach was dictated by political considerations at the time, but it proved unviable militarily because it left the Central Region's defenses in the hands of nations that could not create adequate forces for this mission. A further complication was that West Germany, not yet an alliance member, was still unarmed and vulnerable.

In an effort to build a credible Central Region posture, NATO's members forged their important "transatlantic bargain" in the landmark Paris Agreement of 1954. At that time, the alliance agreed to restore the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) to full sovereignty,

admitting that nation into NATO, and allowing it to rearm. The FRG agreed to a substantial but limited rearmament program that would provide an active military establishment of 500,000 soldiers, 12 army divisions, and associated air and naval forces. It further agreed to commit these forces to NATO under SACEUR's command, not to play a military role that was independent of NATO, and not to develop nuclear weapons of its own. In exchange, the NATO members agreed to commit themselves in ways that ensured the protection of West Germany and its vital interests. In particular, the United States agreed to provide a continuous military presence in West Germany and, through NATO, extended nuclear deterrence coverage over the FRG. Also, Britain, France, and other continental powers agreed to provide military forces, as embodied in the 1952 Lisbon Agreements, that—together with U.S. and FRG forces—would adequately protect the FRG and its forward areas. By blending mutual responsibilities to facilitate defense of West Germany and the entire Central Region in politically acceptable ways, this bargain remains a bedrock of NATO policy today.

NATO'S MILITARY STRATEGY

The years following 1954 were to see a prolonged debate over NATO's military strategy, especially the roles of nuclear and conventional forces. In the early 1950s, NATO had adopted a strategy named MC 14/1 that called for a combined posture of conventional and nuclear forces. The former were entrusted the task of physically defending Western Europe and the latter were given the mission of strategic bombardment of the Soviet Union in a war. In 1957, NATO adopted a new strategy, MC 14/2, assigning the primary role to nuclear weapons and downgrading the importance of conventional defenses, which now were expected to defend for only a very brief period. In this strategy, deterrence was to be achieved primarily through the threat of massive retaliation. In the event of enemy attack, consequently, NATO planned to escalate by bringing U.S. strategic nuclear forces to bear early in the conflict.

MC 14/2, however, soon came under attack, especially after the Kennedy administration took power in 1961. In particular, three arguments were directed against it, all echoing the theme that MC 14/2 relied too heavily on nuclear weapons. First, its critics alleged, MC 14/2 was blind to the risk that the threat of early escalation might not credibly deter a nuclear-armed Soviet Union from launching a conventional attack. Second, MC 14/2 was accused of both denying NATO adequate military options, especially in a limited conventional war, and

being blind to the dangers of escalation. Third, MC 14/2 was charged with being incapable of preserving alliance unity in the years ahead.

Largely because of U.S. leadership, in 1967 NATO replaced MC 14/2 with MC 14/3 (flexible response), which called for a more balanced relationship between nuclear and conventional defenses. MC 14/3 erected a military strategy composed of three interlocking operational concepts aimed at promoting extended deterrence, forward defense, and flexible response:

- Direct defense.
- Deliberate escalation.
- General nuclear response.

MC 14/3 aimed at maximizing deterrence by confronting the Soviet Union with a counterbalancing, credible NATO military response along the entire spectrum of potential aggression. In the event deterrence failed, the strategy called for a controlled, measured response designed to deny the enemy its military objectives. It envisioned that NATO would meet enemy conventional aggression with an initial forward defense aimed at containing Warsaw Pact forces near the inter-German border for as long as possible. If the forward defense broke down, it then called for a "deliberate" use of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level of violence aimed at persuading the enemy to desist. Only in the event deliberate escalation failed would the alliance resort to the massive nuclear retaliation that had been the centerpiece of MC 14/2.

Although often criticized, MC 14/3 has remained NATO's military strategy since 1967 and has grown in internal acceptance as the years have passed. Two reasons account for its longevity. First, although it is not perfect, nothing better has been found to take its place. NATO's nations have been reluctant either to return to a predominantly nuclear strategy or to move in the opposite direction of "no first use," which would allow NATO to use nuclear weapons only if the Soviets used them first. It is complicated internally, but MC 14/3 thus far has been better able than any alternative to support the full range of NATO's military objectives.

Second, MC 14/3 has adequately supported the interests of NATO's members. It responds to U.S. insistence that NATO must have adequate conventional options to ensure that escalation will not be conducted prematurely or in situations when the truly vital interests of the West are not at stake. Additionally, MC 14/3 has supported the FRG's (and other allied) interests by underscoring NATO's commitment to forward defense. With a purely nuclear strategy, the United States and

other NATO members would very likely be reluctant to engage enemy forces directly at the inter-German border in the hope of delaying the decision to escalate. But with MC 14/3, forward defense with conventional forces becomes an acceptable alternative because it does not automatically bring about escalation.

NATO'S TRIAD MILITARY POSTURE

The adoption of MC 14/3 in 1967 led NATO to embark on an ambitious effort to build the kind of "triad" force posture deemed necessary to support flexible response. In this philosophy, NATO's conventional forces provide direct defense, tactical/theater nuclear forces support deliberate escalation, and U.S./U.K. strategic nuclear forces provide the means for the general nuclear response. NATO's defense efforts over the past 20 years have been coordinated, through the NATO "force goals" process, to achieve this goal.

Although far from completely satisfactory, NATO's defense efforts on the whole have been more successful in this endeavor than is commonly realized. NATO's nuclear modernization programs have been aimed at maintaining and further improving forces that, as of 1967, were already reasonably adequate. NATO's conventional programs have been aimed at building a posture that in 1967 was generally considered to be well short of NATO's requirements. NATO's conventional forces have not grown much in overall size, but they have improved substantially in modernization and readiness. As a result, the alliance's conventional forces are in better shape today than ever, relative to their strategic goals. Most assessments suggest that while they have not provided a confident capability to defend Central Europe, they have confronted the Soviet Union with considerable costs and uncertainties. They fall short of meeting MC 14/3's most ambitious objectives, but they adequately meet the minimum goal of deterring war and providing NATO at least the critically needed initial period of one to four weeks of forward defense.

NATO'S FORCE POSTURE: 1990

Strategic Nuclear Forces

The U.S. Strategic Air Command is composed of some 2000 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, about 12,000 nuclear warheads in all. Also included are the U.K.'s 80 SLBM missiles and, as appropriate,

French systems. Under the Strategic Arms Treaty (START) accord now being negotiated, U.S. forces would be reduced by about one-third.

Theater/Tactical Nuclear Forces

Following execution of the "double zero" Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which dismantles NATO's 464 Pershing II/GLCM intermediate range missiles, NATO's residual forces will include Lance short-range missiles, several hundred tactical bombers capable of deep strike operations, and nuclear-equipped tube artillery pieces. About 4500 total warheads are now deployed in Europe. NATO has agreed to negotiations on short-range nuclear forces, but only after a conventional forces Europe (CFE) accord has been reached and on the assumption that its forces in this category will not be eliminated entirely.

Conventional Forces

In peacetime, some 30 combat divisions and 2500 combat aircraft are deployed in Central Europe. In wartime, some 45 division-equivalents (DEs) and 3600 aircraft would be deployed there following about one month of U.S. reinforcement and commitment of French forces. NATO's posture would slowly build to 55-60 DEs but only after a lengthy period of two to three months, well after the expected D-day somewhere around M+30. Additional forces are deployed on the northern and southern flanks. NATO's position in the CFE negotiations allows for a roughly 10-15 percent cut in peacetime levels for tanks, artillery, armored troop carriers, helicopters, and combat aircraft.²

Dismantlement Options

If the West were to pursue dismantlement, this elaborate NATO alliance system could be completely disestablished in a single stroke. As a practical matter, however, it most likely would be dismantled in stages over a period of years, as the situation in Europe gradually improved. Moreover, it might not be dissolved entirely. NATO's members might decide instead to do away with some parts of the alliance while keeping others. In particular, it might try to scale back parts of NATO's military forces, strategy, and command structure while preserving the political commitments that form the alliance's foundation.

²For further information, see *The Military Balance, 1989-1990*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989. See also Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, D.C., 1990.

The following analysis is intended to be illustrative and does not pretend to cover this subject definitively. Five options for dismantlement are portrayed in stark terms that, to some degree, oversimplify a more complex and fluid reality. In each case numerous alternatives deserve a fuller exploration than space allows, alternatives that provide NATO not only a wide range of choices, but also a sequence of smaller, more digestible steps along the way. Also, this analysis intentionally conveys the impression that dismantlement would proceed in a simple, downward step-by-step fashion. Although that could be the case, the process also might proceed in a less stylized and mechanistic way.

Dismantlement of the alliance would probably begin with the partial paring back of NATO's military forces in Central Europe and the flanks (Option 1) in response to a receding Soviet military threat. The core feature of this step is that although NATO would reduce its military strength, its residual forces would be left strong enough—relative to their missions and the threat—to continue supporting forward defense and flexible response in Europe. This drawdown is designed to fall short of the threshold that would compel NATO to alter MC 14/3. In examining the conditions making this step possible, this analysis will concentrate on the nature of Warsaw Pact drawdowns and residual NATO conventional forces that would be needed to keep NATO above this threshold. It will also briefly address the same threshold issue with respect to NATO's theater and strategic nuclear forces.

The next stage of NATO's dismantlement (Option 2) is defined as a larger reduction in NATO's force posture that, even as part of a bilateral arms control accord, compels NATO to adjust its military strategy and how it is implemented. For example, NATO might be compelled to alter its operational doctrine and employment plans for executing the forward defense. This analysis will identify the kinds of doctrinal alternatives that would be available to NATO and assess their implications, then do the same for NATO's nuclear forces. The result will be the portrayal of a range of military strategies that alter MC 14/3's call for a forward defense and flexible response, including its provisions for nuclear coupling, extended deterrence, and deliberate escalation. The analysis will examine the implications of alternative strategies for the West's traditional defense goals and the conditions under which these alternatives could safely be adopted.

Although this change would alter NATO's military strategy and force posture, it would still leave substantial U.S. military forces (nuclear and conventional) in Central Europe and it would make no policy changes in how NATO assigns military responsibilities to its various members (their relative contributions to ground, air, and naval combat, and to nuclear deterrence). The next option (Option 3) in

NATO's dismantlement would go beyond this to alter the transatlantic bargain and the agreements reached in Paris in 1954. In this event, the contributing NATO nations no longer would be bound by their earlier obligation to provide a specific level of forces for the common defense, to perform their present missions, and to live within the Paris Agreement constraints.

The central idea here involves NATO's reversion to its earlier "division of labor" philosophy. Most U.S. ground and air combat forces would withdraw from Central Europe. The United States now would assume responsibility for handling maritime defensive and strategic nuclear missions. The mission of defending the European continent and executing the purely theater aspects of NATO's military strategy would be largely given to the nations there, principally West Germany and France. At issue will be the conditions under which this step is possible. Analysis of this issue will concentrate on the degree of West European integration that would be required to offset the present U.S. contribution.

The next stage of dismantlement (Option 4) would be reached with the partial or complete disestablishment of the NATO organization, including its present forces, strategy, military commands, and civilian institutions. In the extreme case, NATO might revert back to 1950, when only the North Atlantic Council, supported by a small military committee, existed. In this event, NATO largely would become a political alliance, one kept alive through high-level political meetings and the North Atlantic Treaty. The final stage (Option 5) would complete the process of dissolving NATO by cancelling the treaty itself, thereby completely ending the alliance in any form.

Table 1 indicates the nature of each of these five options and Table 2 the NATO changes required by each. Which option makes the most

Table 1

FUTURE DISMANTLEMENT OPTIONS
FOR NATO

| Option | Description |
|--------|---------------------------------------|
| 1 | Reduced NATO defenses |
| 2 | Revised NATO military strategy |
| 3 | Altered transatlantic bargain |
| 4 | Disestablishment of NATO |
| 5 | Cancellation of North Atlantic Treaty |

Table 2

CHANGES REQUIRED BY EACH DISMANTLEMENT OPTION

| Option | Forces | Strategy | Transatlantic | | |
|--------|--------|---------------------|---------------|--------------|--------|
| | | | Bargain | Organization | Treaty |
| 1 | Y | N | N | N | N |
| 2 | Y | Y ^a | N | N | N |
| 3 | Y | Y or N ^b | Y | N | N |
| 4 | Y | Y | Y | Y | N |
| 5 | Y | Y | Y | Y | Y |

"Y" = "yes" (changes made). "N" = "no" (changes not made).

^aTo a greater or lesser degree.

^bIn theory, an altered transatlantic bargain could be pursued with or without a change in NATO's military strategy. The former would have a greater influence than the latter.

strategic sense for the West, and for Europe as a whole? Under what conditions could NATO safely proceed downward from one type of dismantlement to the next?

III. VARIABLES AFFECTING FUTURE REQUIREMENTS FOR NATO

Any judgment about NATO's future requirements, and on whether dismantlement should be pursued, must be based on a thorough analysis of how the forces at work in Europe are likely to shape that continent's evolution over the coming years. This section aims at providing this kind of analysis. First, it individually examines the important variables in the equation: the U.S. policy and presence in Europe, the West's goals and overall security policy, relations with the Soviet Union and developments within the Soviet bloc, and West European integration. The analysis then identifies five different future European security systems that plausibly might take shape to characterize the European scene in the years ahead. Alternatively, Europe might pass progressively from one stage to the next, eventually producing a security architecture that is dramatically different from today's.

U.S. POLICY AND PRESENCE IN EUROPE

In no small measure, NATO is a product of U.S. interests, policies, and strategies. The willingness of the U.S. government to commit itself to preserving Western Europe's security was the principal factor that brought about NATO's creation and its subsequent evolution into an integrated military alliance. Similarly, NATO's future will be influenced heavily by U.S. policy choices, especially regarding the American military presence in Europe. Given this, which directions will U.S. policy probably take? How will domestic political and economic trends in the United States affect choices concerning the evolution of NATO? Will the United States remain committed to preserving a strong NATO, or is it likely to seek disengagement in some form, accompanied by a devolution of power onto allied shoulders and a political accommodation with the Soviet Union?

A fundamental feature of twentieth century American policy has been to prevent Central Europe from falling under the control of any hostile power. During World Wars I and II, the United States remained aloof from Europe's troubles until events had deteriorated to the point of demanding a massive wartime intervention. At the onset of the Cold War, however, the United States made a historic commitment to abandon its past isolationist ways and to commit itself to an

active peacetime involvement in Europe's security affairs. It was this commitment that gave rise to NATO and has permitted the alliance to prosper for the past four decades.

During this entire period, the positioning of large American forces on Europe's soil has played a central role in U.S. policy there. These forces have helped project U.S. influence and have given the U.S. government important options for responding to the crises that periodically have threatened Europe. They also have sent a reassuring signal to the West European allies and have permitted the United States to play a leading role in NATO's decisionmaking, especially through SACEUR, by custom an American general. Additionally, they have come to play a major role in NATO's defense planning. U.S. ground forces defend the V and VII corps areas in southern Germany astride the Fulda Gap, the Meinengen Gap, and other invasion corridors. The reinforcing U.S. III Corps would provide AFCENT (Allied Forces Central) the bulk of its theater reserves, especially for deployment in the vulnerable NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) area. U.S. air forces in Europe, backed by reinforcing assets in the United States, perform many of NATO's most important air intercept, interdiction, and close air support operations. U.S. forces also provide the backbone of NATO's sophisticated command, control, intelligence, and communication system (C³I). And, of course, U.S. forces exercise operational control over most of NATO's theater-based nuclear warheads and delivery systems. All told, U.S. forces provide over one-third of NATO's military strength in the Central Region. In their absence, forward defense and flexible response would be impossible without greatly increased allied efforts.

In addition to providing a strong military presence, the United States has exercised its leadership role by consistently prodding NATO in the direction of combined planning, a coherent military strategy, and a powerful military force posture. For example, the United States was the driving force in the 1960s behind NATO's adoption of the strategy of flexible response. In the 1970s, the United States led the way toward alliance-wide efforts designed to improve NATO's conventional defenses. The 1980s, in turn, saw the United States lead NATO in its decisions on nuclear force modernization and adoption of the Conventional Defense Improvement plan. These American efforts helped shape NATO into the politically unified and militarily strong alliance that it is today.

For the future, the Bush administration has made clear that it expects NATO to remain an active force in European security affairs and that the United States will remain committed to the alliance. This stance was communicated at the NATO summit meeting in the spring

of 1989 and after the Malta meeting with Gorbachev in the late fall. The Bush administration has tabled an offer to reduce the American military presence in Europe as part of a negotiated accord that would limit the U.S. military presence to 195,000 soldiers in Central Europe and to 30,000 troops elsewhere in Europe. It also has expressed willingness to undertake other U.S. withdrawals that might grow out of the CFE negotiations and possible follow-on nuclear talks. But these partial reductions aside, Bush's policy calls on the United States to retain a sizable nuclear and conventional military presence in Europe for as long as security conditions require it.

This stance reflects a continuing U.S. belief that although Asia and other areas have become more important recently, control of Europe remains vital to U.S. interests in ways demanding constancy in guarding against any expansion of Soviet influence. Nonetheless, it also is true that public support for some aspects of the NATO commitment has eroded in recent years. Contributing factors have been high defense spending and frustration over burden-sharing. This discontent is not yet a major factor in official policy, but it conceivably could rise to the point of leading the United States to begin backing out of Europe. Added on top, of course, is the growing sense that the end of the Cold War is reducing the need for sizable troop deployments in Europe. Decisions in this area will be made by both the Executive and the Congress, with public opinion also playing a role.

The future of the U.S. defense budget is another imponderable that could have a deleterious effect on the American military commitment to Europe. The United States has faced serious budgetary constraints in the past and yet always has managed to keep its troop strength high in Europe. Very large cuts in the DoD budget and manpower levels—beyond what is now under consideration—would be required before a wholesale U.S. withdrawal from Europe becomes necessary. Nonetheless, the present NATO commitment, counting NATO-oriented forces in the United States, is a costly one that amounts to about 40 percent of the defense budget. The upcoming era of budgetary stringency could lead to decisions, for example, to reduce U.S.-based reinforcements for Europe, strategic mobility programs, modernization rates, sustainability, and even readiness levels in Europe. The net effect could be a slow but steady withering of the U.S. military contribution to NATO's defenses.¹

¹See Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, 1990. For a critical appraisal of future U.S. defense budgets, see William W. Kaufmann, *Glasnost, Perestroika, and U.S. Defense Spending*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1990.

These considerations seem unlikely to lead the U.S. government to alter its basic policy toward NATO, especially to the point of leaving Europe before security conditions permit. But they do give added impetus to a diplomatic effort aimed at resolving the Cold War to reduce the costs of the present NATO commitment. They also create a strong rationale for an American policy aimed at encouraging greater West European military self-sufficiency. At present, the West European allies are spending only about 3 percent of their gross domestic products (GDPs) on defense, whereas U.S. spending is planned to continue hovering between 4 and 5 percent of GDP. The transfer of additional responsibilities to the allies could help rectify this imbalance and the tensions over burden-sharing that it produces.

THE WEST'S GOALS AND SECURITY POLICY IN EUROPE

In major ways, specific political and military goals that the Western allies have chosen to pursue for themselves have shaped NATO's historical evolution. More than any other factor, these goals have been responsible for NATO's growth from a loose, fledgling collective security pact into a coalition alliance with a full-blown military organization, strategy, and force posture. Inevitably, this will continue to be the case. What then are likely to be the West's interests and objectives—U.S. and allied—in the years ahead? Will its traditional goals continue to be major factors in the West's policy equation? If so, what does this imply for NATO's continuity even if surrounding security conditions change? If these goals are to become less important, which objectives are to take their place, and what are the implications for NATO?

Containment and Beyond

Of all the West's objectives, containment publicly has been regarded as the most important reason for NATO's existence. Containment first emerged in 1946, when the United States and its allies began grasping for an overall concept to guide their policies toward the USSR. By postulating that the West needed to organize itself to block further Soviet expansion in Europe, containment laid an important policy foundation for the establishment and subsequent growth of NATO. Ever since then, it has been the guiding principle behind the West's stance toward the Soviet Union, a nation that the West consistently has regarded as its permanent adversary in Europe. To the

extent that containment continues to be a dominant Western goal, NATO's *raison d'être*—other things held equal—will remain unchallenged. The converse, however, is also true.²

Containment's future clearly depends on how the Soviet Union evolves in the years ahead. Should the Soviet Union change to the degree that it no longer is seen as a political and military threat to Western Europe, one of NATO's most important pillars would be removed. This obvious truth, however, does not imply that such an outcome will be achieved easily. Degree matters here, and containment could be completely discarded only if a truly wholesale change occurs in the USSR. The Soviet Union would have to become transformed into a nation that either pursues benign goals toward the West or lacks the wherewithal to attain malevolent ends. Possibly it also would have to embrace internal values similar to the West's. Although ideological differences do not inevitably lead to war, the two sides continue to embrace different views on the proper nature of government, individual rights, political behavior, and laws governing property and economic behavior. It is unlikely that completely tranquil relations will ever be established as long as a socialist superpower confronts a number of smaller, democratic nations in Europe.

Whether Soviet reforms will go far enough remains to be seen. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union is reforming internally and is seeking better, more stable relations with the West. The recent pace of change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has been far beyond what even optimistic observers would have predicted. It is likely that the future will see further, major changes in this direction, possibly culminating in the emergence of pluralist (or even democratic) systems in Eastern Europe and conceivably including the Soviet Union. The withdrawal of large Soviet forces from the forward areas would probably further accelerate the trend to stable, peaceful relations in Europe resulting in a hollow or even dismantled Warsaw Pact alliance, with the East European nations enjoying substantial independence in their security policy. All this would weaken, if not eradicate entirely, the importance of containment as an organizing concept for the West's relations with the USSR.

Notwithstanding the trends now taking place in the Eastern bloc, it is important to remember that, in Gorbachev's original view, the Soviet Union was to remain a socialist power endowed with major, if less offensively oriented, military power. Also, the East European nations, in his scheme, were to remain primarily under socialist rule, the

²For a critical analysis of the containment doctrine, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1982.

Warsaw Pact was to continue to exist, and the Soviet Union was to remain in substantial control of the invasion corridors to Germany even if Soviet troops were withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Further, Gorbachev's agenda in Western Europe had some disturbing features. His concept of a "common European home" seemed anchored on close Soviet-West European ties against a background of a weakened NATO and a less dominant U.S. role in Europe. These items on his initial agenda suggest that there were decided limits on how far he originally was prepared to push reform. To the extent these goals reflect existing preferences, his recent compromises set aside, they imply that if the Soviet Union changes to the point where containment no longer is necessary, it will be for reasons that go beyond Gorbachev's ability to control events.

The question remains whether Gorbachev himself will remain in power and whether his reform agenda will continue to shape Soviet policy. In European history, previous attempts to reform authoritarian regimes often have provoked conservative counterreactions, especially when events have shown signs of spinning out of control or producing failure altogether. This conceivably could happen again. Should Gorbachev's reforms fail, the Soviet Union might plunge into a period of internal turbulence that could see the reemergence of a hard-line Communist government. Nor is it impossible that, if communism fails entirely, a truculent, nationalist regime might emerge, one that reacts unfavorably to the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the steady expansion of the European Community into that region. At this juncture, the Soviet Union's future evolution is impossible to predict. A reversal on domestic policy need not necessarily mean a retreat from changes in the USSR's foreign and defense policy. But the rise of pluralist democracy, a market economy, and a benign Soviet external policy are not made inevitable simply because they are desirable. Russia has a long history of internal authoritarianism and external expansion. These are reasons for Western caution.

None of this implies that the central problem of the future is likely to be an ideologically motivated attempt by the USSR to recreate the total control over Eastern Europe and threat to NATO of Brezhnev's heyday. The Soviet government's recent disavowal of revolutionary values, however, does not mean that the USSR is likely to become a "status quo" power indifferent to developments along its borders. In the immediate future, the Soviet Union is likely to be preoccupied with its internal troubles, but eventually the pendulum will probably begin swinging back to a more activist foreign policy. At that juncture, the Soviet Union's policy toward Eastern and Western Europe in all likelihood will flow along traditional lines, with the Soviet government

actively involved outside its borders and using the instruments of diplomacy and national power at its disposal.

A critical issue is: What are likely to be the West's goals with regard to the Soviet Union if Soviet military power recedes behind the USSR's borders and the East European nations pull free from Soviet control? Three situations are possible:

- A benign relationship with the Soviet Union in which containment is no longer an issue and Europe settles into an era of stability and peace.
- A mixed relationship, involving a combination of accord and competition, in which stability is achieved through a political equilibrium in Central and Eastern Europe that adequately protects the vital interests of the West, the East European nations, and the USSR.
- A still-stressful relationship in which a hostile Soviet Union continues to cast a dark and threatening shadow over Eastern Europe, and perhaps Western Europe as well.

Containment, and NATO's role in achieving it, would disappear from the West's calculus only in the first alternative. In the latter two alternatives, NATO still would be needed, but with a different mission than now. Although the future is uncertain, the changes at work within the Soviet bloc increasingly will lead the West to broaden its security policy beyond its present emphasis on containment and deterrence at the inter-German border. This process actually started in 1967 when the Harmel Report launched NATO on the path of pursuing detente as well as defense. Present trends suggest that in future years, the West's security policy will increasingly emphasize the complex task of establishing and maintaining the kind of stable equilibrium in Central and Eastern Europe outlined above, one that balances the interests of the West, the Soviet Union, and the East European nations. In the event that relations with the USSR remain stressful, this is likely to lead the West to pursue a security policy that establishes some form of containment and deterrence toward the USSR. In the event that relations with the USSR are tranquil, the West will probably pursue a less contentious policy, one aimed at establishing mutually agreed codes of conduct and rules of behavior.

In any case, the West will require a coherent security policy in Europe of some sort. In the past, NATO has proved to be an excellent mechanism for achieving a Western consensus on overall security policy. The alliance's future will depend heavily on whether the Western nations conclude that NATO will continue to be needed for this

important diplomatic task. The future also will depend on whether the CSCE and the European Community come to challenge NATO's predominance. At present, neither institution is capable of taking NATO's place, particularly as a vehicle for harmonizing U.S. and West European views. For this reason most members maintain that NATO should continue to function in this capacity. As these two institutions grow, however, NATO's importance, at least in some ways, will diminish.

Community-Building in the West

Although containment has provided an important impetus for NATO, for many years it has not been the sole reason for the alliance's existence. When NATO was created, the West embarked upon a historic effort to foster economic recovery across Western Europe, to erect stable democracies there, and to fashion a liberal international economic order. In particular, the West wanted to prevent the kind of instability and subsequent breakdown in internal West European relations that, aided by American isolationism, had produced two devastating world wars. In essence, the Western nations set about to create a transatlantic community of like-minded nations that could achieve enduring prosperity and stability by cooperating together. In this "grand strategy" NATO was perceived as being needed not only to keep the Soviet Union at bay, but also to provide the Western nations with the commitment to collective security and responsible action that would enable this cooperation to take hold. In major ways, NATO thus became a vehicle by which the West, with steadily growing interest and vigor, pursued its internal goal of "community-building."³

The Western nations have made major progress toward this goal over the past 40 years, and NATO has played an important role in helping bring about these gains. One of the most important but easily overlooked developments in postwar Central Europe is that Germany and France have finally come to terms with each other. Also, Britain has largely abandoned its historical policy of staying aloof from continental affairs, while the United States has set aside its isolationist tendencies. For the first time in centuries, consequently, Western Europe is at peace with itself. Moreover, war is ruled out not by a tenuous "balance of power" system, but by genuinely harmonious relations and a sense of common destiny. This change would not have

³A recent account of NATO's formation is presented in Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1986. An earlier analysis is presented in Robert E. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, Chicago University Press, Chicago, 1962.

been possible without NATO and its commitment to the principle of collective security.

Similarly, NATO has proven to be an important vehicle for helping resolve tensions along the southern flank, particularly between Greece and Turkey. Especially in recent years, NATO also has been a useful (if sometimes imperfect) instrument for helping the Western powers coordinate their positions on "out-of-area" problems and a host of other issues. A good example of transatlantic cooperation is the recent Iran-Iraq war, which saw the United States and several NATO allies cooperate together in sending warships to the Persian Gulf to protect Western access to the sea lines of communication. The likelihood that similar situations might arise in future years is one strong reason why the Western allies might be reluctant to part with NATO even if the Cold War ends.

NATO also has provided the security framework that has enabled the Western European nations to pursue their goal of building an economic community among themselves. West European economic integration began with creation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and accelerated with the establishment and steady expansion of the European Economic Community (Common Market) in the 1960s and 1970s. The 1992 project will carry this process an important step forward by further reducing barriers to free trade. The eventual goal of the European Community is not only a high degree of economic integration, but also substantial political integration that will blur present national differences.

While the long-term implications for NATO are unclear, present trends toward integration within Western Europe do not augur well for any early dissolving of the alliance. The West European nations would be hard-pressed to continue integrating in the absence of a security alliance that gives them confidence in each other's intentions. Integration and military collaboration naturally reinforce each other. The West Europeans in theory have the material resources to create their own alliance to substitute for NATO and its military ties to the United States. But they rely heavily on the United States to lead NATO, and they seem unlikely to soon achieve the high degree of political cooperation required to perform such sensitive functions as nuclear deterrence. Also, the United States currently pays over half the cost of NATO's continental, maritime, and nuclear defenses. Reluctance to increase their defense spending, possibly by large margins, is one practical but imposing reason why the West Europeans have been unwilling to abandon reliance on the United States and NATO. To the extent that their defense requirements remain unmanageably high (a function of the future Soviet threat), this is likely to continue being the case.

An additional argument against dissolving NATO is that the West Europeans clearly see value in pursuing positive economic relations with the United States, and the United States reciprocates. This began in 1949 with the U.S.-sponsored European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) and accelerated with the tariff negotiations of the 1960s. Rising tensions over trade relations and the oil crisis in the mid-1970s led to the establishment of the annual Western economic summits and other efforts to coordinate economic and trade policies. Despite recurring difficulties, this process has been successful; the last two economic summits at Toronto and Paris particularly have closed on positive notes. As a result, transatlantic trade continues to grow, formal attempts to coordinate economic policies are expanding, and nations on both sides of the Atlantic are increasingly recognizing the economic benefits that mutual interdependence provides. This trend will be difficult enough to sustain as the 1992 project transforms Western Europe into a unified market, but it is even less likely to continue if the United States and Western Europe were not militarily allied together. Indeed, the emergence of a continental military alliance conceivably might result in the United States and Western Europe eventually coming to loggerheads. At a minimum both might develop an inward-looking, suspicious attitude that, in the face of potential economic rivalry, could lead to the breakdown of transatlantic cooperation. Since mutual confidence in security policy is a condition for economic collaboration, NATO's perpetuation, at least as a purely political alliance, might well be dictated by this consideration alone.

Defense Objectives

Over the years Western policies in Europe have come to be driven by a large number of purely defense objectives that have a direct bearing on NATO's force posture and military strategy. As late as 1947, the West viewed the Soviet threat primarily in political and economic terms; containment originally was not conceived as a military doctrine. This began to change in 1948 when the Soviets imposed the Berlin blockade, thereby giving rise to fears that Stalin might resort to military aggression against Western Europe. As a result, the West began to see the need for a military alliance and doctrine that could cope with what was now perceived as a direct Soviet military threat to Central Europe and the flanks. The following years were to see enormous intellectual ferment over NATO's military strategy, mostly centered on how the alliance could best achieve the following objectives:

- Deterrence
- Defense
- Alliance unity
- Nonproliferation
- Control of escalation
- Crisis stability
- Arms race stability
- Cost control.

Assuming that the Soviet Union remains sufficiently adversarial to necessitate Western planning against that nation's military forces, NATO's future will depend heavily upon whether and to what degree alliance members continue to emphasize these objectives. What is striking about them is their sheer number and the fact that they mostly work together to create a need for an integrated NATO organization and a large, diverse force posture.

Defined in terms of NATO's ability to persuade the Soviets not to attack by making the costs, risks, and uncertainties of aggression far outweigh any rational expectation of gain, deterrence is NATO's most important security objective, but not its only military goal. Over the years, defense—defined as the physical capability to stymie aggression should it occur—has come to rank high in alliance planning. The distinction between deterrence and defense is an important one. In theory deterrence can be achieved cheaply by manipulating enemy perceptions, especially by leading him to conclude that the costs of aggression will be higher than, in fact, they really are. But defense is more subject to direct physical measurement. It cannot be achieved by anything short of a military posture that meets battlefield needs against the threat that the adversary is capable of mounting. In general, the defense objective drives NATO's force requirements upward, often well beyond what might be needed solely for deterrence.

Like defense, the next three goals—alliance unity, nonproliferation, and control of escalation—also have an upward effect on NATO's force requirements. The important point about alliance unity is that NATO's members individually, in protecting their own interests, have different needs for NATO military forces that have a cumulative combined effect. Both the United States and the West Europeans have officially recognized the need for a triad force posture. Within this framework, the West Europeans have emphasized strong nuclear forces for deterring aggression whereas the United States has repeatedly called for a strong NATO conventional posture that could initially handle even major aggression. In reconciling these differing perspectives, the alliance has settled on a requirement-elevating compromise

embodied in MC 14/3 calling for both substantial nuclear and conventional strength.

The goal of nonproliferation has particularly important implications for NATO's nuclear posture. It reinforces the need for both the extended deterrent coverage provided by U.S. strategic nuclear forces and a viable NATO theater nuclear posture capable of a broad spectrum of operations, including strikes against the Soviet homeland. An important factor here is that the FRG has agreed to forsake building its own nuclear deterrent, even though Great Britain and France have chosen a different course for themselves. As long as the FRG remains nonnuclear and the USSR retains a nuclear posture, it is hard to see how this element of nonproliferation can be maintained in the absence of a powerful U.S. and NATO nuclear commitment to Germany, including an alliance nuclear force on Western Europe's soil. In other words, decoupling could trigger further proliferation in Europe, something that the West has long sought to avoid.

The United States has particularly stressed the goal of controlling escalation, but most West European governments have come to recognize its importance as well. In general, escalation can best be controlled by deploying survivable NATO forces that provide flexibility and multiple military options short of massive nuclear retaliation. In particular, NATO's military strategy over the years has come to emphasize the need to meet enemy aggression on its own terms and to conduct escalation in a controlled, deliberate manner. This approach to defense planning creates a need for substantial, diversified nuclear and conventional strength.

The objective of crisis stability has a twofold effect on NATO's military requirements. On the one hand, it dampens requirements by constraining NATO from building military forces that would be perceived as an offensive threat to the Soviet Union, especially one that would prompt Soviet mobilization and a preemptive attack in a crisis. On the other hand, it inflates requirements by compelling NATO to deploy forces that are sufficiently strong to remove any temptation to Soviet aggression in a crisis. It also has an inflating effect by requiring that NATO be sufficiently prepared so that alliance leaders do not have to resort to a preemptive mobilization in a crisis of the kind that led to World War I. Crisis stability thus requires not only substantial, defensively sized military strength relative to the threat, but also adequately high readiness levels and combat units that are deployed close enough to their defense positions to reach them quickly.

On surface appearances, the goal of "arms race stability" is conducive to the idea of dismantling NATO or at least tempering its defense efforts. This step presumably would remove whatever role the West

plays in driving the arms race by threatening the Soviet Union. But even here, realities are more complicated than they seem. NATO's planning traditionally has emphasized the building of a defense posture that falls well short of provocative offensive levels but also is strong enough defensively to ensure that the Soviets have little to gain by pursuing an offensive buildup themselves. The result of insufficiently strong forces could be the exact opposite of what the West would seek by exercising restraint.

Finally, the objective of cost control is favorably disposed to the idea of reducing NATO's forces, which today cost the Western nations roughly \$2-3 trillion every ten years. At the same time, NATO itself is an important cooperative mechanism by which the member nations reduce overall expenditures. For this reason, the NATO nations increasingly have been pooling their efforts in such areas as research and development; armaments cooperation; combined training; integrated command, control, communications, and intelligence; host nation support; and multinational logistics. Although it is difficult to estimate NATO's influence in this area, total alliance spending, in the absence of these measures, would probably be about 25-50 percent higher than now (assuming constant requirements). A reduction in NATO's overall force levels would save money, but the dismantling of the alliance might drive some expenditures higher by reducing opportunities for collaboration.

Implications

In summary, the NATO military alliance system that has grown up over the past four decades is neither an accident, nor a product of bureaucratic imperatives, nor solely a reflection of the Soviet threat. Most fundamentally, it is a product of the West's strategic interests. As Churchill said, interests of this sort tend to be permanent. NATO is partly needed as a mechanism for containment, a doctrine that, however weatherbeaten and eroding, has not yet been sent to the graveyard. Even if containment, as traditionally defined, is replaced, the alliance might well continue needing NATO for implementing a broader security policy aimed at promoting a regional equilibrium in Europe. Beyond this, NATO also is an outgrowth of an enduring Western "grand strategy" aimed at creating a transatlantic community. Its force posture and military strategy are the result of a large set of mutually reinforcing defense objectives and a conscious effort to maintain internal unity and reduce budget costs. For these reasons, NATO has acquired a life of its own that extends beyond the Cold War. This does not mean that NATO is destined to remain a permanent feature

of modern international relations, especially if the United States and Western Europe were to part company or if the Cold War ends entirely. But it does suggest that as long as the West's present goals remain in force, the rationale for NATO is unlikely to disappear just because the Cold War is winding down and limits are being placed on the Soviet military threat.

TRENDS IN WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

NATO was created in part because the West European nations required a close partnership with the United States. How is the need for continued transatlantic collaboration likely to be affected by future progress toward West European integration? To what degree must this trend continue before the United States can begin transferring greater defense responsibilities to the West Europeans? At what juncture will Western Europe be capable of protecting itself to the point that any form of close military alliance with the United States no longer will be necessary? Are the West European nations likely to evolve this far anytime soon? Given our answers to these questions, what does the future hold for the U.S. military presence in Europe?

Perhaps the most important trend in Western Europe is that allied governments continue to support NATO strongly and to value their close partnership with the United States. Despite initial misgivings, they have come to broadly support NATO's present military strategy of extended deterrence, forward defense, and flexible response. Official support for NATO runs high in West Germany and Britain, the nations that (along with France) provide the bulk of Western Europe's military forces. Despite occasional grumbling about the presence of U.S. forces in specific locations (e.g., the U.S. air wing in Spain), the allies have consistently opposed any hint of nuclear decoupling and any major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe. Periodic attempts (mostly by France) to create a West European pillar to replace NATO and dependence upon the United States thus far have gone nowhere. The official policy of allied governments is that NATO's military forces should be reduced only to the extent that reductions in the Soviet threat permit, that NATO's residual forces should be fully adequate to support alliance military strategy, and that the alliance will remain an important cornerstone of the future European security system.

Most West European governments thus far have been reacting cautiously to the reform process in the Soviet bloc. All are clearly elated at the opening of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, and other steps to improve East-West relations. But

they generally seem skeptical about whether Gorbachev's reforms will work, whether the Soviet Union has reverted to a purely defensive military strategy, and whether the Cold War is truly over. Thus far they have shown no interest in abandoning NATO even though tensions are visibly cooling in Europe. Their preference seems to be to let economic and political reforms proceed well ahead of any changes in the West's security apparatus.

Of particular importance is the stance of the Federal Republic of Germany, the front-line state most heavily affected by the changes underway in Central Europe. In Bonn, the Kohl government, led by Foreign Minister Genscher, has staked out an independent position on nuclear modernization and the West's diplomacy toward the Soviet Union. But in its underlying attitudes, the FRG government has remained strongly pro-United States and has shown no inclination to pursue a "Mittle Europa" role of its own. In reacting to Gorbachev's surprising endorsement of reunification, both Kohl and Genscher maintained that a unified Germany must remain a member of NATO and its integrated military structure. Genscher's sole concession to Soviet demands for German neutrality as the price for reunification was an endorsement of the idea of keeping East Germany free from NATO's forces. Within Germany, however, elements of the opposition SPD party have endorsed the idea of neutrality in exchange for reunification.⁴ A debate clearly lies ahead, and it is likely to be settled only by upcoming elections. Conceivably an SPD victory could lead to Germany's withdrawal from NATO. West Germany has gone through similar electoral debates before and has always emerged solidly committed to NATO. This stance could change now, but the Soviet Union's own declining bargaining power is reducing Gorbachev's ability to compel Germany to make concessions that would weaken its long-range interests.

Neither the FRG nor other West European nations have yet shown any interest in developing their own institutional structure to replace NATO and their military dependence on the United States. Even after the 1992 project brings them a major step closer to economic and political integration, the European Community (EC) will lack a substantial

⁴The SPD evidently is divided internally on NATO's future. In early March 1990, several SPD parliamentarians announced their support of Germany's remaining in NATO and its integrated military structure. Historically, the SPD has shown internal cleavages on its attitude toward NATO, with one faction calling for a more neutralist German policy and the other calling for close participation in NATO. See James L. Richardson, *Germany and The Atlantic Alliance: The Interaction of Strategy and Politics*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966. See also Catherine McArdle Kelleher, *Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1975.

security arm. None of the major West European powers, including France, as yet seems prone to breathing this kind of life into the EC anytime soon. Although some steps have been taken lately to reinvigorate the West European Union (WEU), this institution remains a small player on the European scene. In essence, NATO remains Western Europe's principal security anchor.

An important issue will be whether the West European nations will be able, over the coming years, to absorb the alliance functions—military and political—now performed by the United States. A strong inhibitor is that coalition planning requires a great deal by way of multinational cooperation and coordination. It is most readily achieved when one nation is dominant enough to lead the process in establishing a common vision and committing resources. It is much more difficult when several smaller nations must pool their resources, the entire enterprise can be scuttled if a few fail to perform, and historical animosities among the participants remain. For this reason, there are grounds for skepticism that, in the absence of U.S. leadership, the West European nations could cooperate well enough to build an alliance of their own anytime soon. Full political integration, an eventual European goal but one unlikely to be achieved in the foreseeable future, probably will be necessary before an independent West European military alliance becomes possible.

The West European allies continue to recognize the implications of this constraint. Although satisfaction with NATO is by no means universal, most allied capitals evidently believe that the arguments in favor of NATO are strong: Why go through the political trouble of creating a new western security apparatus when a decent one (NATO) already exists? And why create a new alliance that excludes the United States? To them, membership in NATO has liabilities, but it offers major strategic advantages and actually works with a modicum of efficiency.

Another important factor is raw economics. The West European allies currently spend only about \$130 billion, or roughly 3 percent of their GDPs, on national defense. In essence, they get security on the cheap because the United States pays for roughly half the cost of the military forces needed to protect Western Europe. Over the years, this relationship has allowed them to spend heavily on domestic investment. All that would change if the West Europeans ended their alliance with the United States when they still faced pressing military requirements for deterring a Soviet threat. Replacement of U.S. combat forces in Europe alone would probably compel the nations in Central Europe, absent an appropriately large reduction in the threat, to bolster their defense spending by about 25 percent. Replacement of

U.S. reinforcing units and naval assets, which contribute heavily to NATO's military strategy, would require another 25-50 percent increase. The cost of substituting for U.S. nuclear forces would drive their budgets up another 25 percent. When all budgetary effects are taken into account, including infrastructure programs and R&D requirements, the total bill would require nearly a 100 percent increase in their defense spending.

The West European allies are likely to remain unenthusiastic about wholesale changes that would deprive them of these economic benefits, and they would probably not be able to generate the resources to provide security for themselves if the U.S. contribution was suddenly withdrawn. When we look into the future, their economic growth is likely to receive a boost from the EC in 1992. As a result, their combined GDP is likely to grow considerably over the next 15 or so years. This growth should permit them to absorb more NATO functions, but the extent will be constrained by inflation, economic aid to Eastern Europe, and the fact that weapons costs often rise as fast their national economies are growing.

Barring a fundamental change in West European defense priorities, the future offers opportunities for a rather slow devolution of alliance military responsibilities onto the allies' shoulders, rather than an abrupt transfer that would have to accompany a speedy, complete dismantling of NATO. Faster progress will need to come from political changes and arms control negotiations that reduce the Warsaw Pact threat in ways that substantially shrink NATO's military requirements. Under circumstances of a major downshift in the threat, the West Europeans would at least have the resources, if not necessarily the coalition-planning capacity, to achieve much greater military self-sufficiency. Short of this, present trends in West European integration indicate a NATO course of stability, not dismantlement.

Under what conditions, short of a major upswing in European integration, might the West European nations choose to withdraw from NATO and go it alone? One possibility would be a loss of confidence in American constancy, or a dramatic rise in transatlantic frictions that could lead them to lose faith in their partnership with the United States. Another possibility would be diplomatic dynamics in Europe that might lead them to view membership in NATO as either unnecessary or a barrier to progress. For example, the FRG plausibly might withdraw from NATO if this step became necessary for achieving reunification. Also, the West European nations might conceivably conclude that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process offers a better mechanism than NATO for preserving their security and for developing a more cohesive Europe that can

better stand on its own in dealing with both superpowers. At present, trends in Europe do not seem to be leading sufficiently in any of these directions to trigger Germany, France, or other nations to leave the alliance. Nonetheless, each of these possibilities is being actively discussed in Western Europe today and cannot be lightly dismissed, especially if West European fear of the Soviet Union dissipates entirely. At a minimum, in contrast to past years, alternative avenues are opening up to the West Europeans. Much will depend upon whether NATO adapts to the emerging situation in ways that make continued alliance membership attractive to them.

TRENDS IN THE SOVIET BLOC

NATO, of course, is also a product of East-West relations. Given this, how is NATO's importance likely to change as a function of potential improvements in relations with the USSR and political change in Eastern Europe? To what degree do we realistically expect relations with the Soviet Union to become warmer, and at what pace? If the Soviet "threat" to Western Europe does diminish appreciably, at exactly what point will NATO become unnecessary, or at least susceptible to alteration? Under what military and political circumstances can the Western allies begin dismantling their defenses and otherwise relaxing their guard? If the Soviet Union reverts to a defensive military strategy, to what extent will NATO still need to maintain a defensive military shield for itself? What should be the nature of this shield? What sort of NATO force posture, military strategy, and alliance system will be needed to deter the Soviet threat of the future?

Breathtaking changes clearly are at work within the Soviet bloc that are reshaping the face of socialism and its stance toward the West. From Stalin's heyday onward, the Soviet Union remained a totalitarian monolith with a command economy, rigidly pursuing a foreign policy of suppression in Eastern Europe and relentless competition with the West. Evidently concluding that this policy had resulted in an economic stagnation and international isolation that was transforming the Soviet Union into a second-rate power, Gorbachev decided to embark on a dramatic departure by launching perestroika and glasnost.

Events since then have seen steps to make the USSR's political structure more democratic, to transfer greater authority to state institutions, and to encourage free market forces in limited ways. The Communist Party has abandoned its constitutional claim to a monopoly on power and the Soviet Union has embarked on the path of establishing a presidential system of government. Socialism by no means

has been officially abandoned, but the USSR clearly is moving toward greater economic and political pluralism. Moreover, the physical composition of the Soviet Union is itself in question. The Baltic republics, led by Lithuania, are all moving toward independence, including withdrawal from the Soviet Union. Georgia has begun demanding independence, and similar sentiments are being heard from Moldavia and, to a lesser degree, the Ukraine and Azerbaijan. Gorbachev evidently hopes to stem this tide by creating a looser, federalist structure, but his ability to achieve this goal is increasingly coming into question.

Along with internal reforms, Gorbachev has launched an ambitious attempt to improve relations with the United States and Western Europe, principally by portraying the Soviet Union as a trustworthy, moderate power. An important aspect of this policy has been Gorbachev's disavowal of the Brezhnev doctrine and his active encouragement of self-determination for the East European nations. Gorbachev's diplomatic campaign has been accompanied by his self-proclaimed adoption of a new Soviet defense policy of "reasonable sufficiency," thereby implying both a defensive outlook and a determination to scale back unnecessary military expenditures.

Initial steps in this direction have included the signing of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the unilateral Soviet military reductions announced in December 1988, and Moscow's pursuit of accords in the START and CFE talks. Although major strides thus have been made in the short time since Gorbachev launched his reforms, the entire process is, by his own admission, far from complete. In gauging its effect on NATO's *raison d'être*, the critical issue is whether this process will continue to the point where the Soviet political-military threat to Western Europe is eliminated not only in rhetoric, but also in reality.

The defense reductions that Gorbachev has embraced, both unilaterally and as a product of negotiations, will slash Soviet military forces by as much as 50 percent. Beyond doubt, this is a large amount. At the same time, it also is true that since the Soviet Union was a military leviathan to begin with, it is able to absorb large cutbacks and still have enough military power to pose a major threat to the West. For example, a START agreement will leave the Soviets with some 1600 nuclear delivery vehicles and 6000 warheads—enough to devastate both the United States and Western Europe. Similarly, the CFE negotiations will leave the Soviet Army with about 100 ground divisions, a great deal smaller than the current posture of over 200 divisions, but, if mobilized, still large enough to mount a serious offensive campaign against Western Europe. Perhaps the Soviets will reconfigure these

forces in ways that inhibit offensive actions, but it also is possible that the Soviet Army will wind up "leaner and meaner" with an array of new weapons and structures that will facilitate offensive doctrines. This aspect of Soviet reform bears close watching.⁵

A sizable (or total) withdrawal of Soviet ground forces from Eastern Europe clearly would cut heavily into the Kremlin's ability to attack Germany, especially with little warning. Given the continued presence of a large, offensively capable army within the USSR's borders, however, even this withdrawal would not completely eliminate the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. Much would depend upon the Eastern European nations and the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact military alliance, as well as on NATO's residual defenses. As mentioned earlier, the Soviets evidently are trying to preserve a security relationship of some sort with Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. If successful, this plausibly could provide them the political latitude for crossing the invasion corridors to Germany without first having to overpower East European resistance along the way. Whether the Soviets will succeed is an open question.

Before 1989, the East European Communist regimes seemed firmly enough in the saddle in all these countries to grant the Soviets their wishes. Then, with dramatic suddenness, events exposed the unstable, illegitimate nature of these regimes. First, the Polish Communist Party was humiliated at the polls and forced into a coalition government with Solidarity. Simultaneously, the Hungarian Communist leadership, previously a leader of the reformist movement, was toppled for being too stodgy. The Communist Party there soon changed its name, and the entire nation embarked on the course to open democratic elections. Shortly thereafter, the Honnecker regime in East Germany fell, and its successor, faced with a massive internal upheaval, was compelled to launch a desperate series of reforms aimed at stemming the tide. Just as East Germany was beginning to calm down, Czechoslovakia exploded in mass demonstrations that quickly drove the old-guard Communist leadership out of office. Following Czechoslovakia's "velvet" revolution, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia began moving toward democratic reforms, the East German leadership changed once again, and a violent revolution took place in Romania resulting in Ceausescu's execution and the weakening of the Communist Party. This left Albania as a last outpost of the old guard. As if on cue, the early weeks of 1990 found the virus of revolution spreading there as well.

⁵For a review of Soviet defense programs, see *The Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1989. See also *Soviet Military Power*, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Even these dramatic developments paled into insignificance when Gorbachev, in late January, stunningly endorsed German reunification. To be sure, Gorbachev and other Soviet spokesmen attached important qualifications: that unification proceed in a step-by-step fashion, that it be consistent with overall European stability, that the four powers have a major say in developments, and that Germany preferably should withdraw from NATO. But the first and last of these caveats seemed to fade into the background as February unfolded. In one stroke, Gorbachev had endorsed the demise of the East German state that the Soviet government had worked hard and long to make legitimate. Shortly thereafter he finalized agreements to withdraw Soviet forces from Czechoslovakia and Hungary by mid-1991. With these steps, he apparently had endorsed the sweeping political change that seemed destined to produce a wholesale Soviet military withdrawal from East Germany and a unilateral abandoning of the forward presence that had been the centerpiece of Soviet European policy since Stalin's days.

Precisely where this process is headed remains to be seen. When they triggered the reform process, Gorbachev and his advisors evidently miscalculated in assuming that Communist rule in Eastern Europe was sufficiently institutionalized to ensure survival in openly pluralist systems. Gorbachev's insistence that Soviet troops would never again be used to crush rebellion in Eastern Europe helped open the floodgates of populist revolution, through which poured millions of reformers intent on capitalizing on the opportunity at hand. As a result, the Soviets are now faced with democratic revolutions that might well completely topple Communist rule in all the East European nations and propel reformist-style parties to power. This clearly bodes ill for Soviet designs in Eastern Europe. As likely as not, a few years from now the Soviets will find themselves facing nationalistic, Western-oriented, and even democratic regimes.

These nations are unlikely to continue acting as pawns for Soviet diplomacy, or to play an active role in any future Soviet military action against NATO. A variety of neutralist options are open to them, perhaps by emulating Finland or Austria. Political realities being what they are, however, future East European regimes, even if internally democratic, may recognize the need to avoid provoking Soviet wrath. This could lead them to retain their membership in the Warsaw Pact and to grant the Soviets important concessions in joint planning, military exercises, logistics stockpiles, and other manifestations of a military alliance. Czechoslovakia and Hungary, which have demanded complete Soviet military withdrawal, seem least likely to fall into this category. But Poland, which sits astride the traditional invasion corridor to the USSR and evidently fears a united Germany, is another

matter. For this reason alone, the Warsaw Pact, in the final analysis, might not wither to the point of becoming a completely hollow alliance. Precisely where it will fall along the spectrum of cohesion is impossible to predict. As things stand now, it is not yet certain that political reform in Eastern Europe will completely deny the Soviets the ability, in a crisis, to use this region (especially Poland) as a springboard for an attack on Western Europe. But the forces at work in Eastern Europe clearly are pointing in the direction of a vastly weaker Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, and perhaps the eventual departure of the East European nations from the Warsaw Pact. Beyond doubt, developments of this magnitude would dramatically transform the European security system and NATO's role in it.

FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM, 1990-2005

The shattering defeat suffered by communism in 1989 and early 1990 might well have fundamentally altered, if not ended, the struggle between democracy and totalitarianism that has dominated Europe for the past 70 years. At issue is the kind of security system that is likely to replace the old bloc-to-bloc structure. Table 3 examines this issue. On the horizontal axis are displayed five different European security systems, along with their central characteristics. The central thesis here is that if Europe keeps changing along the lines envisioned above, it is likely to pass progressively from one system to the next, along the timelines displayed in the table. Europe might settle at one system along the way (or even reverse course), but it might also complete the entire journey.

This table, it must be emphasized, does not purport to offer a fixed blueprint for Europe's future. By no means does it exhaust the possible permutations and combinations or offer any automatic sequence of events. Rather, it is a heuristic device for thinking about Europe's future by bringing conceptual order to a highly complex phenomenon and by clarifying matters regarding the nature and pace of change in Europe. Essentially, it offers a forecast of one evolutionary path that Europe might follow, but with enough stops along the way to illuminate a variety of alternatives. Taken together, the five systems portrayed here offer a useful analytical framework for thinking about Europe's future because they help span the spectrum of uncertainty in a way that highlights the variety of possibilities ahead, and they pose quite different implications for NATO's requirements, role, and

Table 3
FUTURE STAGES IN EUROPE'S EVOLUTION

| System | Stage | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Time horizon (years) | Through 1989 | 1-3 | 2-5 | 3-7 | 5-15 |
| Status of Germany | Divided | Unified | Unified | Unified | Unified |
| Status of Soviet forces | Large deployments | Reduced to post-CFE levels | Withdrawn except from Poland | Withdrawn entirely | Withdrawn entirely |
| Status of Warsaw Pact | Surface cohesion | Eroded cohesion | Hollow | Dismantled | USSR not a major adversary |
| Status of other institutions | | | | | |
| • EC | Steady economic growth, slow political integration, expansion into EFTA and Eastern Europe | | | | |
| • CSCE | Slow, steady expansion of regulatory role | | | | |
| Foundation of system architecture | | | | | |
| • Cohesive NATO | — | Bipolar | Muted bipolar | 1-1/2 bloc | Collective security |
| • Decreasingly cohesive NATO | Bipolar | Bipolar | Muted bipolar | Multipolar | Collective security |
| System stability | | | | | |
| • Cohesive NATO | Low/medium | Medium | Medium/high | Medium/low | Very high |
| • Decreasingly cohesive NATO | — | Medium/low | Medium/low | Low | High |

internal structure. As a result, they will be useful later in analyzing how, and in which ways, NATO should pursue the twin paths of dismantlement and transformation.

What primarily distinguishes one security system from the next is a marked difference in the political character and military preparedness of the Warsaw Pact. In essence, Table 3 envisions a progression of events that, if completed, eventually will culminate in the complete dismantlement of this alliance. Stage A is the traditional but rapidly crumbling bipolar European security system, characterized by the NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation at the inter-German border, with massive Soviet forces deployed forward and the West European nations heavily dependent on U.S. military support. This has been a politically tense system, with a high degree of conflict between the two blocs. Its stability is labeled "low/medium" because of the long history of crises that have occurred since 1947, the competitive arms race that has marked its existence, the potential for short-mobilization attacks, and the fact that the East European revolution of 1989 has exposed the illegitimate nature of Soviet domination. It can be argued that a NATO-Warsaw Pact war has failed to occur only because of the presence of nuclear weapons, not to any underlying political stability. The traditional Cold War system, in its structural elements at least, still shakily endured as of late 1989 in the sense that the Warsaw Pact remained a formal military alliance and Communist parties still clung to power in most East European states. At the same time, the events of 1989 clearly rocked this system's foundation and pose the prospect of truly structural changes ahead in very short order.

Stage B portrays the European security system that would result after Germany is unified and a CFE I treaty has been implemented. This alternative could be achieved in the short term (one to three years, depending largely on the time required for implementing CFE). The security architecture would still be one of "bipolarity": Sizable Soviet forces would remain in the forward areas, the Eastern European nations (minus the GDR) would remain as active, if unenthusiastic, members of the Warsaw Pact, and the two blocs would remain in political conflict. Since the threat of a surprise Warsaw Pact attack on NATO has been reduced through asymmetrical CFE reductions that achieve military parity in the "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" (ATTU) region, political tensions have been reduced to a "medium" level and stability has improved relative to the present system. Since this alternative could be achieved in the short term, the West European allies are unlikely to have reached any measurably greater degree of military self-sufficiency.

Stage C, plausible in 2-5 years, describes a system of "muted bipolarity." Its main feature is a hollow Warsaw Pact in which virtually all Soviet military forces have completely withdrawn behind the USSR's borders; and the East European nations, by now fully nationalist and possibly democratic, remain as only nominal members of the Warsaw Pact. Assuming NATO remains intact, this system is likely to have low political tension and medium-high stability for two reasons: The threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe has declined to a very low level and the Soviet Union, still with a security buffer in Eastern Europe, itself feels fairly secure.

Stage D is characterized by a major political change in the security order over the next three to seven years that probably culminates in the emergence of a 1-1/2 bloc system architecture (assuming a still cohesive NATO). In this system, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East European countries (as nationalist democracies) have withdrawn from the Warsaw Pact and have established increasingly strong relationships with the European Community and the West. Mutual defense treaties linking these nations to the Soviet Union, however, might continue to exist. The Soviet Union is assumed to be an internally troubled socialist nation (a noncommunist nationalist regime is another possibility) that continues to have difficult relations with the West.

Compared with stage C, this system would be characterized by greater tension and less stability, because the old bloc-to-bloc system of ideological confrontation between democracy and communism will probably give way to a new, three-tiered set of conflicts and strains brought about by the collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. First, ethnic strains within Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, coupled with growing ethnic attachments between East European nations and bordering Soviet republics (e.g., Moldavia) are likely to resurface. Second, old conflicts between individual nations (e.g., Bulgaria vs. Turkey and possibly Poland vs. Germany) may very well reappear. Third, and perhaps most important, the spread of the European Community's influence into East Europe and the growing pro-Western orientation of nations there is likely to be regarded as threatening by a Soviet government that faces serious internal troubles of its own. These three patterns of conflict do not necessarily imply an inevitable conflagration, but they are likely to interact in ways that do not augur well for the cause of stability.

The degree of tension and instability in this system would depend heavily on the exact status of Germany. The system would be least stable if a reunited Germany were to have disassociated itself from NATO in exchange for reunification and had begun pursuing an

independent course designed to pull nearby East European nations into its diplomatic and economic orbit. In this event, a stressful East-West confrontation could break out again, with the focal point being Soviet opposition to Germany's influence over Poland and Czechoslovakia. This system would be most stable if Germany remains firmly anchored within a still-cohesive NATO and East Germany is militarily neutralized. Stability would be further enhanced if the CSCE process has been expanded to develop firm rules of restraint and codes of conduct in Eastern Europe that govern both the West and the Soviet Union. In this case, both Germany and the Soviet Union might feel sufficiently secure to render the system less tense and prone to destabilizing crises.

In stage E over the course of 5-15 years the Soviet Union has evolved into a largely nonadversarial actor in the European security system. By that time, the Soviet Union would have progressed a long way down the path of reform. Its government is stable, its economy is fairly normal, and its foreign policy seeks tranquil relations with Western Europe and the United States on terms that respect those nations' interests. This system is dominated by "collective security" concepts, in which the CSCE process has become an important institutional basis for the European security architecture. In any event, the East-West relationship is no longer highly adversarial. Diplomacy emphasizes maintaining agreed-upon codes, rules, mutual obligations, and principles of legitimacy that ensure stability by protecting the security interests of all participants.

Relative to the other alternatives, stage E is highly stable. Nonetheless, a collective security system does not imply such a degree of consensus that conflict is completely resolved. What characterizes "collective security" is a mutual commitment requiring members to come to each other's aid if stability is threatened by one member or by an outside aggressor. Another characteristic is a balance of power that preserves equilibrium. Stresses and frictions continue to exist in ways that make this balance an important requirement for stability and that necessitate a conscious adoption of security management policies, including the preservation of suballiances (e.g., NATO). The need for active security policies, and sizable military forces to support them, would become less pronounced if stage E eventually were to give way to a true "Concert of Europe," rendered stable not by a balance of power but rather by a fundamental consensus on shared values. Although such a development is eventually possible in Europe, it is assumed here to be beyond the 15-year time frame of this study.

The transitional nature of Table 3 suggests that although Europe's evolution will be heavily influenced by changes within the Soviet bloc,

parallel developments are likely to occur in other areas that will have an increasing effect as the years pass by. The United States is assumed to maintain a political-military presence in Europe, but the West European allies are projected to gradually acquire a larger capacity to meet NATO's conventional force requirements in Central Europe. Meanwhile, the European Community is projected to grow steadily and to expand to include members of the European Free Trade Association as well as Eastern Europe. Additionally, the CSCE is projected to grow in stature, scope, and mission. Given these changes, one of the important tasks facing the West would be to alter NATO internally in adjusting to Western Europe's growing strength. Similarly, NATO's policies would need to be harmonized with the expanding role of the European Community and the CSCE to ensure that all three institutions work together.

In addressing the future role of the CSCE and the European Community, Table 3 suggests that while major uncertainties exist about the pace at which Europe as a whole will evolve, these two institutions are likely to grow only slowly and steadily. As a result, the old bloc-to-bloc security architecture will probably be swept away well before these two institutions can have matured to where they play a major role in establishing a stable new architecture. This problem is one reason for being cautious about dismantling NATO and sacrificing its security contribution anytime soon.

Finally, Table 3 suggests the degree to which the presence or absence of a strong NATO is likely to affect the security architecture of each system and its stability. A cohesive NATO would make each security system more stable, rendering the security architecture less multipolar. Under the influence of a strong NATO, stability increases as Europe passes from stage A to stage B to stage C. However, stage D, which might linger for several years, would not be a highly stable system even if NATO remains in existence as a cohesive alliance. The reason is that Germany's partial reunification coupled with the Warsaw Pact's collapse would have deprived the Soviet Union of its geographical buffer zone against the West. As Western Europe's influence spreads eastward and the East European nations are drawn into the European Community, the Soviet Union is presumed to act in a fearful, hostile manner. This problem is presumed to disappear only several years later in stage E, when the Soviet Union comes to terms with the West and the new security conditions in Europe.

What is striking about this table is that substantial tension and instability would continue to exist in all but the final stage. Moreover, a truly "collective security" system (stage E) will not be attained in one simple, giant leap. It is likely to come about only after Europe has

passed through a lengthy evolutionary process that could include a several-year stopover at the potentially dangerous system of stage D.

Much would depend upon the exact timing of events in several different, highly interrelated areas. In this regard, the rapid pace of change in Eastern Europe today could itself become the continent's undoing. A slowed-down approach, one aimed at orchestrating events to prevent destabilizing shocks, seems safest for all concerned. But if the Warsaw Pact does unravel along new lines contemplated in stages C and D, and if Germany unifies at an equivalently fast pace, a critical issue will be whether the USSR's internal reforms proceed with equal rapidity. If the pace of Soviet reform can be accelerated faster than expected here and brought to fruition, the risks of stage D might be largely avoided. Similarly, these tensions might be alleviated if East-West diplomacy resolves Germany's status and other issues, and if the Soviets are offered credible reassurances regarding Eastern Europe's neutrality. Also, acceleration of West European integration, through the EC, could help stabilize European security affairs by anchoring Germany more deeply in the West. All these developments could ease the transition process. In their absence, the transition could be rocky and might not result anytime soon in the stable collective security system that is desired.

IV. GAINS AND LOSSES OF DISMANTLING NATO

This heuristic forecast of Europe's future evolution concludes that preservation of a cohesive NATO would be needed to help ensure stability and a smoother transition from one stage to the next. But exactly what are the requirements for a cohesive alliance in each of these stages? And to what degree would NATO be able to meet these requirements and still pursue dismantlement? At issue is whether, under what circumstances, and to what degree dismantlement makes sense, taking into account the gains and the losses that would accrue to the alliance and the requirements for stability at each stage of Europe's evolution.

The present alliance system imposes costs on its members but also offers an array of benefits. On the cost side is the high budgetary expenditure (3-5 percent of gross national product annually for each nation) needed to meet NATO's military commitments. Another cost is political entanglement: NATO requires some sacrifice in peacetime sovereignty by all members. Beyond this, NATO practically guarantees that if any one member is attacked, all others will be drawn into the fray. It thus places constraints on national decisionmaking in a crisis. This is the sort of commitment that nations historically have been reluctant to accept and often have been eager to cast off when the need for an alliance is no longer paramount.

NATO's benefits primarily include military security against the Warsaw Pact threat, a common security policy, efficiencies through coalition planning, and internal commitments that make Western community-building possible. Over the years, NATO's members, individually and collectively, have perceived that these benefits greatly outweigh the costs of alliance membership. This judgment is registered in the fact that NATO has been an enormously stable alliance. Indeed, NATO's membership slowly has expanded over the years. Only France has chosen to disassociate itself. Even in that case, France withdrew only from NATO's integrated military structure, not from the alliance itself; moreover, France has gradually been returning to the fold with increased military cooperation.

In recent years, the alliance has been pursuing the path of further integration, not disbandment. This trend has been reflected not only in economic affairs, but also in military planning, where such accords as the Host Nation Support (HNS) program reflect the willingness of

NATO's members to accept further commitments in the interest of fostering military efficiency. Although the new European security conditions will contribute to the stalling of future steps toward greater integration, the recent trend lines do not point toward the dismantling of the alliance. Given this, what calculus of benefits and costs could possibly motivate NATO's members to reverse course and pursue an entirely different direction from the one that they have been following, in strategically productive ways, for the past 40 years?

The dismantlement of NATO could offer payoffs in three areas. First, it could reduce defense budget costs (assuming a reduced threat), although the reality here might wind up being less attractive than initial appearances might suggest. Second, dismantlement would enable NATO's members to cast off the political burdens of alliance commitment, to fully regain their sovereignty and their latitude, and to pursue a different, presumably more attractive course in their foreign policies. In particular, a reduction in present nuclear burdens could be attractive. Third, dismantlement, some would argue, could help pave the way to establishment of better relations with the Soviet Union and its Eastern bloc allies. This could come about through the progressive reduction of force levels on both sides and other military stabilizing measures that reduce offensive potential and surprise attack incentives. In a larger sense, NATO's dismantlement (along with the Warsaw Pact's), in theory, could remove an important political and institutional symbol of East-West confrontation and the Cold War.

Under proper conditions all three of these reasons, taken together, might motivate the West to dismantle NATO. Nonetheless, the NATO nations thus far have been willing to bear the budgetary and entanglement costs of alliance membership. For this reason, the lure of better East-West relations seems to be the most important reason behind interest in dissolving NATO. One argument for pursuing this course contends that NATO should be dismantled as a byproduct of the Cold War's coming to an end, with the process to proceed in parallel with the relaxation of East-West tensions. A more extreme version is based on the premise that NATO is a partial cause of the Cold War by posing a threat to Soviet interests that invites a hostile counterreaction. This argument contends that dismantlement should be used as a means to encourage the Cold War's demise. This step would be intended to remove one important source of tension in Europe and to encourage the Warsaw Pact to follow suit. The result presumably would be the acceleration of Soviet reform, thereby facilitating the cause of East-West rapprochement.

The primary argument against dismantlement is that even in a period of reduced Cold War tensions, NATO continues to serve the

West's vital interests and security objectives. This argument endorses a cautious stance toward taking risks in the face of uncertainty, especially since an error could have disastrous consequences. Cautioning that Gorbachev's reforms may prematurely lull the West, it opposes the relaxing of NATO's guard on the grounds that the Soviets must be reassured about the West's intentions. It is based on the premise that the West has a legitimate right to defend itself, that any Soviet domination of Eastern Europe is unacceptable, and that the Soviets are well aware that NATO poses no threat to their legitimate interests. Additionally, it contends that a strong NATO plays a positive role in encouraging the Soviets to come to terms with the West. Accordingly, it advocates a NATO policy aimed at preserving NATO's defense posture even as the West tries to achieve better relations with the Soviets. In effect, this is the position that the NATO heads of state adopted at the May 1989 Brussels Summit and at the December ministerial session.

There is concern that the dismantling of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, even if done together, might not affect Europe symmetrically. The Soviet Union clearly benefits from the Warsaw Pact's existence, but it has not absolutely needed this alliance to defend itself, to dominate Eastern Europe, or to pose a major military threat to the West. Stalin, after all, got along without the Warsaw Pact long after NATO and its integrated military structure had been created. What seems to have stimulated the Warsaw Pact's creation in 1955 was not NATO per se, but the West's decision to rearm West Germany. Even today, the Soviet leadership could continue to pursue its traditional goals in Eastern Europe without the Warsaw Pact's institutional structure, especially if the communist parties there continue to wield some influence. Depending on circumstances, the Soviet Union's mutual defense treaties with the East European nations, political contacts with East European governments, and the USSR's geopolitical strengths could provide Moscow with adequate instruments of influence and control.

By contrast, the Western nations require NATO if they are to work together on behalf of their collective security. One reason is to cement their mutual commitments. Above all, NATO is needed to tie the United States to Western Europe's security and to keep intact the agreements that place limits on Germany's military forces. Also, NATO is unlike the Warsaw Pact in core features that influence the West's ability to achieve coalition planning. In contrast to the Warsaw Pact, NATO is not the creation of one superpower that largely imposes its designs on weak, vulnerable subordinates. It is an alliance composed of a large number of genuinely sovereign nations, each of which enjoys major latitude in its security policy. As a result, NATO helps

the Western nations resolve disputes, harmonize their policies, and coordinate their military strategies and defense plans. Above all, NATO helps the Western nations stay together, rather than succumb to centrifugal forces.

Consequently, the dismantlement of both alliances, in the midst of a still-existing Cold War, could work to the West's disadvantage. The West European nations would be left without a military alliance to join them together under U.S. leadership, facing a potentially still-real Soviet threat to their security. This would leave the Soviet Union in position to play a game of "divide and conquer" by manipulating the fears and aspirations of West European nations individually. It is precisely for these reasons that the Soviet Union has often endorsed this step, and NATO has rejected it each time. The most recent case is the West's 1989 rejection of Shevardnadze's call for the dismantling of both alliances.

DISMANTLEMENT OPTION 1: REDUCTION OF NATO'S FORCES

This option involves cuts in NATO's conventional forces in Central Europe (and on the flanks) as well as nuclear drawdowns. Otherwise, NATO's military strategy would remain unchanged. This option is most directly associated with a stage B European security system, involving a post-CFE environment of bipolarity, a still fairly cohesive Warsaw Pact, and a residual Soviet military presence in the forward areas. Under these conditions, how far could NATO reduce its military forces without endangering its defense strategy?

NATO would have little margin of safety for unilaterally undertaking any conventional defense cuts in the face of a still-real, offensively sized Warsaw Pact threat. At present, NATO has the equivalent of only about 30 divisions and 2600 tactical combat aircraft in Central Europe. In wartime, this posture would grow by D-day (M+30) to about 45 divisions and 3600 aircraft as a result of reinforcement by U.S. and French units. This ground posture is sufficiently large to conduct a forward defense initially by virtue of its ability to cover the terrain along the inter-German border in adequate density. Assuming (for the moment) East European participation in a Soviet invasion, these NATO forces could find themselves facing an offensively sized posture of some 90 Warsaw Pact divisions and 4000 aircraft. As a result of this large disparity, most Western analyses have concluded that NATO's forces would probably be overpowered within two to three weeks, perhaps sooner. Unilateral cuts by NATO against a constant threat would further weaken this already precarious position.

NATO's ground posture has lacked the theater reserves to provide staying power against a major enemy offensive. As a result, crippling enemy breakthroughs would occur early, thereby allowing Warsaw Pact forces to wage a maneuver war in the rear areas designed to defeat NATO in detail. Even a minor NATO unilateral drawdown would exacerbate this problem by cutting heavily into NATO's already thin reserves, rendering its posture vulnerable to breakthroughs even earlier, perhaps after only a few days. This would violate not only MC 14/3's call for a forward defense but also its goal of at least delaying escalation until after a lengthy initial period (ideally a month). This delay is aimed at allowing for diplomacy aimed at ending the war and, at a minimum, giving NATO enough time to reach an internal consensus to use nuclear weapons. A unilateral withdrawal thus could undermine NATO's military strategy in important ways by leaving NATO's posture even more brittle than now.¹

Let us turn now to the alternative of a bilateral accord arising out of the CFE negotiations (phase I). Under what kind of accord could NATO safely accept force cuts of this sort? Two considerations seem to apply in this case. First, Warsaw Pact forces would have to be reduced to the point where they no longer enjoy military preponderance over NATO in sheer size and capability. Second, NATO's residual forces would have to be sufficiently large to continue executing the forward defense concept. The resulting force balance, after a phase I CFE accord, thus would have to be not only militarily stable but also supportive of NATO's strategy.

These considerations have led the West to adopt a CFE-I negotiating position, covering the entire ATTU region and calling for asymmetric reductions to parity at a level of only 10 percent below NATO's present D-day posture. This would leave NATO (and the Warsaw Pact) with about 40 divisions and 3100 combat aircraft in Central Europe. The idea behind this concept is to provide NATO with enough early available forces to execute its traditional "frontal" (layer cake) interpretation of forward defense against the residual Warsaw Pact threat from forces in the ATTU region, while also enabling the

¹More detailed appraisals of these views on the conventional military balance are presented in R. Blackwill and F. S. Larrabee (eds.), "The Conventional Military Balance in Europe: Strategy, Forces, and the Dynamics of War," *Conventional Arms Control and East-West Security*, Duke University Press, Durham, N.C., 1989, pp. 44-65. Other studies include James A. Thomson, *An Unfavorable Situation: NATO and the Conventional Balance*, The RAND Corporation, N-2842-FF/RC, November 1988; Paul Davis, *The Role of Uncertainty in Assessing the NATO/Warsaw Pact Central Region Balance*, The RAND Corporation, N-2839-RC, December 1988. For an academic debate about the military balance, see a series of articles written by Barry Posen, Joshua Epstein, John Mearsheimer, and Elliot Cohen in *International Security*, various editions, 1984-1988.

draw on units based outside the ATTU region. This position has the surface appearance of unfairness by demanding far larger drawdowns by the Soviets than NATO is prepared to give in return. However, since the Warsaw Pact's forces have been sized for offense (whereas NATO's are defensively sized), a larger cut for them is appropriate. In essence, an asymmetric reduction of Warsaw Pact forces leading to parity is necessary to achieve the first condition for military stability in which neither side enjoys any physical advantage. Also, legal reasons (equal rights) require NATO to demand parity as the outcome of a CFE accord.

Parity, of course, also could be achieved at levels far lower than post-CFE I levels. This opens up the possibility of follow-on agreements that would bring about deeper cuts in both sides' post-CFE I residual posture. Cuts on the order of 30-50 percent of NATO's posture commonly have been discussed by analysts for a postulated CFE-II agreement. Drawdowns of this magnitude have the appeal of reducing forces on both sides to much lower, less dangerous levels. Weighing against this idea is concern that NATO might not be left with enough forces to defend forward along traditional lines and that 50 percent cuts might either leave NATO vulnerable to enemy concentrated attacks or compel adoption of a more flexible doctrine that might be hard to execute. As of early 1990, analysts found themselves debating the technical issues, and NATO's governments had not yet made any decisions on CFE-II goals.²

In the years ahead, the West's technical deliberations over its conventional force posture in Central Europe in stage B seem likely to be replaced by a larger policy and strategy calculus brought about by the momentous events of 1989. The ongoing political collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Eastern Europe will, when completed by stages C and D, by themselves reduce the residual military threat to NATO to considerably less dangerous levels than contemplated by CFE-I negotiating concepts. Indeed, they raise questions about the policy advisability of pursuing a CFE-II accord at all, especially if this accord would legitimize Soviet military access to the forward areas and strip away the defenses of East European nations against forceable reentry.

Similarly, the impending unification of Germany (assuming Germany remains within NATO and its integrated military structure) is

²For a discussion of the technical issues, see Paul Davis et al., *Variables Affecting Central Region Stability: The Operational Minimum and Other Issues at Low Force Levels*, The RAND Corporation, N-2976-USDP, September 1989. See also David A. Ochmanek and Edward Warner III, "Approaches to Conventional Arms Reduction," in Blackwill and Larrabee, 1989.

likely to have a major, but as yet uncertain, effect on NATO's military requirements. By definition, East Germany's unification with the FRG will compel NATO to extend defense protection and alliance military strategy over the new German territory. At the same time, some version of the Genscher plan ultimately will be implemented, thereby placing sharp constraints on NATO's ability to station alliance forces on East German territory or otherwise militarize that territory in traditional ways. For these reasons, NATO's future defense environment is likely to be quite different from the old one.

As discussed later, in stages C and D NATO will probably face a residual threat that would involve a possible Soviet reentry into Poland with up to 60 Soviet divisions, following six weeks to three months of mobilization, ultimately leading to an attack on German territory launched across Germany's eastern border. Against this threat, German and other NATO forces would be required to mobilize, transit across German territory, and establish defense positions along the Oder-Neisse river line. NATO's defense strategy thus would have to be altered to adopt an entirely new geographic focus for forward defense.

In this situation, NATO's future defense requirements would be determined not only by the size and timing of the residual Soviet threat, but also by the nature of the terrain to be defended. In this regard, there are preliminary grounds for both concern and optimism. The border of reunited Germany would be fully as long as NATO's present defense line in West Germany. Also, East Germany juts out as an open salient that seems to invite a Soviet flanking maneuver through Czechoslovakia. Equally worrisome, Berlin, Germany's capital, lies dangerously close to the eastern border. These considerations, taken alone, seem likely to keep NATO's defense requirements quite high.

Other considerations, however, will have a moderating effect. Although a 60-division Soviet threat is a substantial one, the likelihood that it could be brought to bear only after a much longer and more difficult mobilization and reinforcement period than now suggests that many of NATO's forces could be maintained at lower readiness levels than at present. This would permit an increased reliance on less-expensive reserve formations. Additionally, certain geostrategic and terrain considerations might well operate to NATO's advantage. Although the Soviets could seek to transit through Czechoslovakia, the political factors at work may lead them to direct their operations against the German government while respecting Czechoslovakia's neutrality. Also, the limited size of the Soviet attacking force, potential resistance by the Czech army, the mountainous terrain between Czechoslovakia and Germany, and the possibility of flanking NATO attacks from East Germany militate against this step. These factors

could enable NATO to focus its planning efforts primarily on defending only the 310-kilometer front along East Germany's border rather than the much longer 750-kilometer front of past years.

Although Berlin's exposed position is a daunting consideration, the East German terrain otherwise would ease NATO's defense problems. NATO's shortened new defense line would enable its commanders to deploy fewer forces into frontal positions than now. This would permit the formation of larger NATO operational reserves, thereby reducing NATO's traditional vulnerability to envelopment tactics. NATO could also make adjustments in how frontline responsibilities are assigned, thereby reducing present problems with the "layer-cake" array. Further, the Oder-Neisse river line offers a natural defense barrier. Behind it are several other north-south rivers that provide logical fallback positions, as well as forested terrain south of Berlin that would impede swift enemy offensive operations. Additionally, NATO's commanders now would benefit from much greater strategic depth before Germany's major western industrial areas became exposed. These considerations are grounds for optimism about NATO's defense prospects, provided the alliance maintains adequate forces for the task.

NATO's future requirements are still highly uncertain and much analysis lies ahead. The truncated nature of the Soviet threat is likely to substantially reduce NATO's requirements, perhaps by as much as 50 percent. As long as forward defense and flexible response remain core features of NATO's military strategy, the issue of an operational requirement (at some level) is likely to remain a factor in NATO's defense planning.

Although the details are too complicated to address here, the concept of an operational requirement at parity also applies to NATO's future nuclear forces. NATO's nuclear forces are generally better endowed than their conventional counterparts. As a result, NATO already has appreciably reduced its tactical nuclear stockpile in Europe and has signed the INF Treaty, which completely removes long-range/intermediate-range nuclear forces missiles from its inventory. Also, the United States has endorsed the principle of deep cuts in the START negotiations, and NATO has held out the prospect for additional negotiated reductions in its remaining theater nuclear forces after the CFE talks have succeeded. But, as NATO has officially recognized, there does come a point below which its nuclear forces cannot be cut without undermining alliance strategy.³

³For a discussion of NATO's nuclear forces, doctrine, and arms control proposals, see Arnold Kanter, "Nuclear Weapons and Conventional Arms Control" in Blackwill and Larrabee, 1989.

NATO's nuclear requirements are determined partly by the size of Soviet nuclear forces. Thus, reductions in these Soviet forces would have the effect of reducing NATO's nuclear requirements in this area. However, these requirements are also influenced by other important considerations. Over the years, a dominant factor in NATO's strategy has been that both theater and strategic forces are needed not only to deter enemy nuclear attack, but also to help deter nonnuclear aggression by backstopping NATO's vulnerable conventional defenses. As a result, it has long been believed that because of the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority, NATO would require sizable nuclear forces even if the Soviet Union did not possess them. Indeed, this belief was partly responsible for NATO's decisions in the 1950s to deploy large nuclear forces well before the Soviets were able to do likewise.

This calculus will be greatly altered by a CFE-I accord and by the other events in Europe contributing to a sharp scaleback in the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat. In the future, NATO's conventional forces presumably will be capable of deterring nonnuclear aggression on their own, thus allowing NATO to reduce its present reliance on nuclear forces for this mission. NATO's specific requirements for nuclear forces in this area will very likely diminish, especially its stockpile of nuclear tube artillery rounds, tactical air bombs, and short-range missiles, many of which are targeted against Warsaw Pact maneuver units, tactical airbases, logistic supply networks, and other conventional targets. This could permit further drawdowns and, political conditions permitting, possibly the removal of most nuclear warheads from their present locations.

Even so, however, NATO's strategy will remain dependent on possession of at least some theater nuclear weapons. First, these weapons would be needed to deter an enemy nuclear attack, which the Soviets could still launch. Second, nuclear weapons would provide a hedge against a possible failure of the conventional defenses, which still could occur at parity. NATO will therefore be unable to fully embrace the kind of "no first use" doctrine that some have recommended in recent years or to disentangle nuclear weapons from its conventional defenses entirely.

For NATO's theater systems, two criteria will apply in future years. First, NATO's residual nuclear forces will need to convey a positive political signal that preserves alliance unity: They will need to avoid the appearance (and the reality) of decoupling. Second, they must continue to be effective militarily, to provide a sufficient array of battlefield options and targeting capabilities to support MC 14/3's call for a

deliberate escalation. This means that they must enable NATO to climb the escalation ladder, beginning with a demonstrative use; going through tactical, militarily effective use against Warsaw Pact forces in forward areas; and culminating with strikes against targets in the Soviet homeland.

Whether these requirements will translate into a decision to continue deploying a sizable nuclear warhead stockpile in Germany itself remains to be seen. The Kohl government's opposition to Lance modernization in 1988 reflects the antinuclear groundswell of German public opinion, which could grow into vocal opposition against the continued storage of even already-deployed warheads. Even if all warheads were withdrawn, they could be returned quickly in a crisis; however, the traditional belief is that forward-deployment enhances coupling and that any subsequent return might be highly provocative. This report postulates a major but not total withdrawal over the next few years, coupled with a go-slow stance on nuclear modernization. The issue is clearly contentious and will undoubtedly trigger stiff debates in the future.

In any assessment of NATO's strategic nuclear force levels, similar and equally complex political-military criteria apply. The alliance's present posture might be called a "federated, multinational system." This means that contributing forces are retained under the control of their parent nations, while doctrinal, targeting, programmatic, and command-control issues are coordinated through NATO's planning mechanisms. The United States provides the bulk of NATO's forces, supplemented by Britain; France's nuclear forces are not part of NATO's integrated military structure. Because U.S. and British forces are maintained under national sovereign control, they must remain sufficiently large to underscore extended deterrence in appearance and reality. This means that they must be visibly capable of providing an umbrella of extended nuclear deterrent coverage over West European nations, especially those that do not possess similar forces of their own.

Explicit military criteria also are applicable. Although NATO's military strategy allows for the first use of nuclear forces, the West's conservative design standards specify that U.S. and British strategic forces also must be capable of absorbing a surprise Soviet nuclear attack and then retaliating effectively. In retaliating, NATO's forces must provide sufficient targeting capabilities to support its military strategy and SACEUR's war plans for a general nuclear response. They must therefore be capable of destroying Soviet urban areas and industrial facilities. But they must also be able to strike Soviet military targets in the

USSR homeland that NATO's theater systems cannot readily reach. As is commonly known, this target system gives rise to a rather large set of requirements for forces, warheads, and operational capabilities.⁴

All three legs of NATO's triad—conventional, theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces—will remain subject to residual operational requirements that constrain how deeply NATO can reduce in stage B and beyond. These requirements are based on political and military considerations that derive directly from alliance military strategy and the vital interests underlying it. These requirements also provide more than a floor, however. They offer coherent guidelines that together give NATO room for fairly substantial combined reductions of present forces in a series of arms control accords and in parallel with Soviet reductions.

The net result of conventional and nuclear drawdowns along these lines clearly would not resolve the Warsaw Pact-NATO military confrontation in Europe. Sizable forces would remain on both sides. Nonetheless, the situation would be substantially better than now. Force cuts of this magnitude could save NATO's members roughly \$200–300 billion over ten years. More important, the European military balance would be stabilized because of highly asymmetric reductions in the Warsaw Pact threat, increasing Western Europe's security but not exposing either side to aggression by the other. NATO would now enjoy numerical parity with the Warsaw Pact in all force elements and still be able to execute its own military strategy. Meanwhile, NATO's members would continue to enjoy all the other benefits that alliance membership now provides.

DISMANTLEMENT OPTION 2: ALTERED NATO MILITARY STRATEGY

As described earlier, this option involves much larger cutbacks in NATO's conventional and nuclear forces, enough to render the residual posture incapable of meeting future operational requirements. This would create pressures for NATO to abandon MC 14/3 and to adopt an altered military strategy. At issue is whether and to what degree

⁴For analyses of strategic nuclear force issues, see Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, *Strategic Nuclear Targeting*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1986; Ashton B. Carter, John D. Steinbruner, and Charles A. Zraket, *Managing Nuclear Operations*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1987; and Edward L. Warner III and David A. Ochmanek, *Next Moves: An Arms Control Agenda for the 1990s*, Council on Foreign Relations, New York, 1989.

NATO could safely pursue this option if either stage C (a hollow Warsaw Pact) or stage D (a dismantled Pact) is reached.⁵

NATO's future conventional defense requirements will probably be appreciably less than they are now, but some level of requirement will continue to exist. To the extent that NATO's future forces meet these requirements, the core features of flexible response and forward defense will be unchanged. Indeed, NATO's ability to execute MC 14/3, compared with that of past years, will be enhanced. But to the extent that NATO's forces fall below necessary thresholds, a less sanguine situation would prevail.

The principal risk is that in the period of mounting European-wide euphoria, NATO's members will individually make political decisions to scale back their defense contributions too sharply. The result could be a NATO posture that falls well short of future requirements in Central Europe. An inadequately large posture would not necessarily leave NATO bereft of conventional defense options. But it could leave NATO's commanders with no option other than to adopt a classical doctrine of "trading space for time" in a major way. This is the kind of retrograde-oriented doctrine that the alliance was compelled to adopt in the 1950s, before the West German Army was formed and NATO otherwise had established viable defenses. This doctrine was abandoned in 1963 when the forward defense concept was officially adopted, and its reappearance now could hardly be characterized as progress even though NATO's commanders will probably have greater physical depth for maneuver in the years ahead. In particular, Berlin's exposed position creates an obvious political impediment to this step.

Similar considerations and tradeoffs apply to the prospect of large cuts in NATO's conventional forces elsewhere, especially along the southern flank. In Turkish Thrace (which guards the Turkish Straits), northern Greece, and Italy's Po valley, NATO currently plans for a forward linear defense aimed at protecting exposed territory. In all three locations, NATO's forces are now large enough for their missions and could absorb small cutbacks. However, major cuts would compel them to adopt some version of the alternative concepts described above, thereby sacrificing forward defense. The same situation also applies to Denmark on the northern flank, but less so to Norway, whose large urban areas lie mostly in the south. Even there, however, Norway's mountain passes in the far northern areas must be defended to prevent

⁵For background information on the evaluation of NATO's military strategy, see William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, Harper and Row, New York, 1964; Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough: Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969*, Harper and Row, New York, 1971; and Jayne E. Stromseth, *The Origins of Flexible Response*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1988.

loss of critical assets nearby, and that requires a certain minimum density of forces.

Equivalently large cutbacks in NATO's nuclear forces would create pressures for revising MC 14/3 in other, equally important ways. Reductions of this nature would constrain NATO's ability to escalate deliberately in the manner now planned. The alliance would still be left with ample options to conduct low-scale employments (e.g., a demonstrative use or limited uses in purely local, tactical situations). Depending upon the nature of the residual posture, however, NATO would be less able to conduct the larger, theater nuclear campaign that might be needed to forestall an unexpected conventional defeat. For example, removal of nuclear artillery rounds would undercut NATO's capacity to conduct battlefield nuclear operations of the sort needed to contain breakthroughs or otherwise prevent defeat on the ground. Removal of NATO's Lance missiles and tactical air bombs (and delivery aircraft) would erode NATO's capability to conduct strikes more deeply in the enemy's rear areas. The net effect of reductions in both areas would be to propel NATO toward a more rapid escalation from conventional defense to a general nuclear response.

Similar reductions in the alliance's (especially U.S.) strategic nuclear forces would limit NATO's long-range targeting flexibility. Given the high priority attached to targeting enemy urban areas as the bedrock of nuclear deterrence, NATO's counter-military targeting capability would probably be sacrificed first. Although degree and specifics matter greatly here, the lack of a full targeting capacity in this area would erode NATO's ability to execute a general nuclear response aimed primarily at enemy military forces. The net effect would be to push NATO's military strategy in the direction of targeting Soviet urban areas sooner than now planned.

In summary, reductions that left NATO's forces unable to meet residual operational requirements could have a deleterious effect on MC 14/3. An improperly large cutback in only one leg of NATO's triad could not readily be offset by strengthening the other two legs. The three legs of NATO's triad are interdependent, but they are not redundant or substitutable. NATO could not readily compensate for weakened conventional forces and their forward defense capability by maintaining adequate nuclear forces, nor could it offset the loss of sufficient nuclear forces and their escalatory options by maintaining satisfactory conventional defenses.

Beyond this, each of MC 14/3's functions must be performed effectively for the strategy to work as a whole. For example, the feasibility of escalating deliberately increases when the forward defense is conducted effectively. The converse is also true. When NATO's

conventional forces are holding up well, and are buckling in only limited places, tactical nuclear strikes can be kept limited and even can be conducted on enemy soil. But if NATO's defense line were to collapse entirely, NATO would have to resort to large-scale use of battlefield nuclear weapons and possibly would have to employ them on allied soil. Even then, the utility of this response would be uncertain because, in mobile maneuver operations, forces on both sides often become too entangled for effective nuclear targeting. Similarly, effective use of NATO's theater nuclear forces can make the task of the strategic forces easier and limit the degree to which they must be employed.

For these reasons, MC 14/3 is a rather brittle strategy that could come unraveled as a result of improperly large NATO force reductions. The weakening of one leg of the triad not only would damage that leg's ability to perform its own function but would also have a ripple effect throughout the entire strategy and posture. Reductions in two legs would have an even larger effect, and reductions in all three legs essentially would make MC 14/3 a hollow strategy.

Whether NATO would respond to reductions of this magnitude by going through the disruptive and painful process of officially revising MC 14/3 is an open question, one whose answer depends upon the circumstances at the time. Military reasons for doing so would be apparent within official circles and, regardless of how NATO responded, the remaining capabilities of NATO's forces would largely determine the kind of strategy that could be supported operationally.

The exact military strategy that the alliance would be driven to adopt, *de jure* or *de facto*, in the aftermath of these reductions would depend heavily on the composition of NATO's residual conventional and nuclear forces. A few general observations will illuminate three alternatives. First, a posture with adequate conventional defenses but insufficient nuclear forces would provide a viable forward defense, but one backed up by reliance on a rapid nuclear escalation that violates MC 14/3's provisions for moderation and deliberation. This would apply if either or both of NATO's nuclear legs were rendered inadequate. Second, a posture with satisfactory nuclear forces but inadequate conventional defenses would preserve deliberate escalation and a measured general nuclear response, but would sacrifice forward defense. Third, a posture that was inadequate in all three legs would undermine all these aspects of MC 14/3.

In the third case, NATO essentially would be left with MC 14/2. It would be able to mount either a brittle conventional defense or a yielding defense that cedes territory. In the event of a conventional failure, it would then have to follow with escalation leading quickly to a

massive retaliation by strategic forces, including against enemy cities. This would amount to a historic setback for NATO by reversing much of the progress that has been made over the past 30 years in acquiring a posture that could support MC 14/3. But even less dire alternatives would leave NATO's strategy in a worse situation than now.

Under what conditions could NATO safely alter its military strategy in one or another of these ways? Obviously, it could abandon part or all of MC 14/3 if it consciously chose to set aside the underlying objectives that gave rise to this strategy. A more important issue is how the United States and its allies would react to the prospect of a less ambitious strategy, given the likelihood that they would still consider these objectives to be important, other things equal. At present, public opinion in Western Europe (and in the United States to a lesser degree) is showing a growing aversion to military issues and the burdens of national defense. To the extent this attitude continues, public reactions to a NATO strategy change thus would probably not be especially adverse. However, the reaction of NATO governments, which are more attuned to enduring interests and the possibility that political atmospherics can change quickly, might be another matter.

Of all the changes discussed above, the one that would be most likely to trigger a negative West European reaction would be any alteration that weakened extended deterrence. On many occasions over the past 25 years (e.g., the 1962 Athens Ministerials and the 1987 Reykjavik Summit), West European governments have shown themselves to be highly sensitive on this score. This especially has been the case for Germany, which is particularly dependent upon U.S. nuclear coverage. Although the German political debate currently focuses on reunification, Gorbachev's reforms, and the turbulent situation in Eastern Europe, this situation is unlikely to change anytime soon. Extended deterrence and the U.S. nuclear umbrella remain a latent but still powerful factor in German politics.⁶

Where the United States has asserted an interest of its own, and has shown considerable sensitivity, is in the area of flexible response and deliberate escalation. The United States continues to support a NATO military strategy that allows for first use of nuclear weapons, including in response to purely conventional aggression. But ever since the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, the United States also has consistently made clear its opposition to any NATO strategy that made early, massive escalation inevitable. Of all the NATO nations, it has been the most insistent on the need for conventional strength and

⁶For background information on German and other European attitudes on nuclear weapons, see David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1983.

multiple nuclear options. As a result, it would be the nation most likely to oppose any future changes that undermine NATO's strategy in this area.

This leaves the equally important matter of forward defense, including East German territory after unification. Obviously, Germany is the nation that has most taken the goal of forward defense to heart. NATO's commitment to a forward defense was a critical condition that the FRG attached to its willingness to rearm and enter NATO in the mid-1950s. Its attitude has changed little since then. Indeed, the FRG played a major role, politically and militarily, in NATO's decisions between 1963 and 1975 to move the defense line forward to the inter-German border. As for the future, it is hard to gauge how German public opinion would react to an abandonment of forward defense that might never have to be implemented because the Soviet threat had largely receded. But to the extent that a threat still existed, it is likely that the German government—regardless of which parties are in power—would feel unnerved.

Apart from Greece, Turkey, and Norway, most other West European governments are less enthusiastically committed to forward defense. But several are by no means indifferent to the idea. For example, France, the low countries, and Denmark have consistently seen forward defense as a means for providing a protective buffer for their own countries. This is precisely why France recently has been affiliating its forces more closely with NATO and why these other countries in past years have willingly accepted forward corps sector responsibilities for guarding German terrain that leads directly to their borders. Adoption of a defense that trades space for time would reduce the depth of this buffer, and thus it might not be well received even in these nations.

On balance, the idea of altering NATO's strategy in ways that turn the clock back on MC 14/3 is not a minor issue in intra-alliance relations. Degree matters of course. And if East-West relations were to improve to the point where NATO's military strategy no longer was a salient issue, this change might not attract much attention. But in less favorable times, the consequences could be more severe. The United States, West Germany, and other NATO allies might all come to the conclusion that their vital interests had been compromised.

This form of dismantlement could strain NATO in ways that might reach to the core of the political commitments that bind the alliance together. The issue of a coherent military strategy clearly declines in importance in periods of relaxed tension, as is the case now. But when East-West tensions are on the rise, NATO requires not only a commitment to collective security but also agreement on an explicit military strategy that physically protects the security of all its members. An

unraveling of NATO's strategy, if followed by a downturn of events in Europe, thus could call into question this collective security pledge, especially if extended deterrence, forward defense, flexible response, and deliberate escalation were all undercut. That would weaken the U.S. commitment to Western Europe's defense and leave Germany and other allied nations facing the prospect of nuclear decoupling. Germany would simultaneously find its own forward area vulnerable because NATO's forces no longer intended to protect it. The German government might well come under internal pressures to pull up its anchor in NATO and pursue an independent course. The result would be to stress the European security system, possibly in ways leading to instability.

While the consequences are uncertain, the West would be reluctant to take this risk in the absence of larger changes in East-West relations that made its present military strategy unnecessary. Under what conditions, then, could NATO move to this plateau? Clearly this would require more than stage B leaving the Soviets with a sizable presence in Eastern Europe and the freedom to reinforce from the western USSR. The central requirement is a major and permanent physical and political receding of the Soviet military threat to Western Europe. This does not necessarily mean that the East and the West would have to cease having a political relationship characterized by rivalry in some areas. But it does mean that the NATO nations would have to feel comfortable with the idea that, for safety's sake, they no longer would need to take seriously the scenario of a Soviet invasion of Central Europe (or on the flanks). This would be the guiding criterion for pursuing this option in a major way.

Under these conditions, NATO could be able to relax its two most fundamental principles of planning: a coherent military strategy for actually fighting a war that serves the alliance's multiple objectives and an adequate defense posture supporting that strategy. With these principles relaxed, NATO would be able to accept a defense posture that sends a clear message of political resolve but is not necessarily well designed to fight an actual war.

To many, the idea of a NATO-Soviet/Warsaw Pact war already is beyond imagination and might have been so for many years. However, the methodology of NATO force planning traditionally has not adjusted military requirements in response to changing political atmospheres. In many ways, the issue to NATO has been a simple proposition: Either an adversary is or is not a potential enemy against whom advance preparations are in order. Once an affirmative decision is made and not revoked, force planning has proceeded in a logical progression from strategy selection to force design, a process that has been mostly divorced from the daily ups and downs of diplomacy.

NATO's force planning is focused far in the future, deals in the realm of uncertainty, and is based on the principle that political intentions can change quickly. It tends to be prudently conservative, it aims at reducing risks, and it demands high confidence and insurance. It also recognizes that political events can unfold far faster than forces can be built and therefore assumes that discretion is best. In this spirit, many NATO planners believe that peace has been preserved in Europe since World War II not because Soviet intentions have been innocent, but because NATO always has been wise enough to maintain a powerful deterrent. Many also believe that the relative military strengths of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have greatly affected European security politics even in peacetime by influencing the self-confidence, predilections, and behavior of both sides. For these reasons, the contingency of a NATO-Warsaw Pact war continues to dominate NATO's defense planning even though East-West political relations have improved recently.

In future years, NATO's force planning can hardly afford to become divorced from political realities in Europe. Yet the changes that would be necessary for NATO to abandon a hard-headed stance in some wholesale way are demanding. Required would be virtually a complete Soviet military pullback from Eastern Europe and a sizable conventional drawdown in the USSR itself, one possibly stretching beyond the ATTU region. Soviet reversion to a truly defensive military strategy and a benign foreign policy would also be necessary. Along with that would have to come a major change in the Warsaw Pact as a military alliance and in its susceptibility to Soviet domination. In essence, the East European nations would have to acquire sufficient autonomy to ensure that the Soviets no longer enjoy ready access to the invasion corridors to Western Europe, especially Poland. They would have to be politically and militarily capable of actively blocking any Soviet effort to move large forces into the forward areas in a crisis. Changes of this sort would reduce the likelihood of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe to the point where this scenario no longer is sufficiently plausible to be taken seriously in NATO's defense planning.

Would stage C, which envisions a virtually complete Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe and a hollow Warsaw Pact, suffice? The answer depends heavily on exactly how "hollow" the Warsaw Pact becomes. At issue is whether the East European nations, especially Poland, would be sufficiently beyond the USSR's grasp to ensure that the Soviets could not use these nations as a springboard to attack Western Europe. Stage C would confront NATO with considerable ambiguity and uncertainty on this score. This stage envisions that the East European nations have evolved into nationalist and democratic

systems that no longer are active political partners of the USSR. But these nations also would remain as nominal members of the Warsaw Pact as a concession to their Soviet neighbors. Moreover, communists might (or might not) remain in control of the defense ministries in these nations, and combined Soviet-East European military training might continue. In particular, Polish acquiescence to Soviet re-entry in a crisis could neither be taken for granted nor entirely dismissed in advance. It would become a highly important variable in NATO's planning equation, rather than a known constant one way or the other. Much would depend upon the exact nature of the crisis in question, and the internal power balance within each East European nation at the moment. In some circumstances the Poles and other East Europeans might resist Soviet pressures, but in other circumstances they might cave in.

Given this risk, stage C most likely would not represent a sufficiently benign environment to allow NATO to safely discard the contingency of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe as a basis for its planning. As a result, NATO would need to preserve a coherent military strategy and a sound force posture to execute it, one that could eventually build to about 40-50 divisions (assuming a Soviet attacking force of up to 60 divisions). At the same time, stage C would favorably alter the nature of NATO's planning contingency in ways that would reduce many of NATO's specific military requirements. The withdrawal of the Soviet Army and the likelihood that the East European nations would refuse to participate actively in a Soviet invasion would completely eliminate the danger of a surprise Warsaw Pact attack launched after only a few days of warning. This alone would ease NATO's present planning dilemmas. In all likelihood, the Soviets would have to mobilize sufficient forces within the USSR to conduct the invasion alone, without East European help. The task of assembling, training, and moving troops forward would be quite time-consuming—a matter of weeks and months. All this would work to NATO's advantage. In particular, it would enable NATO to reduce its present readiness standards, to require fewer U.S. forces deployed in Europe in peacetime, and to rely more heavily on reinforcement from the continental United States.

Stage D envisions the complete dismantlement of the Warsaw Pact brought about by the withdrawal of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East European nations. Mutual defense treaties linking Poland and Czechoslovakia to the Soviet Union might remain in effect, but they would not provide the Soviets a viable basis for reentry into Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union is presumed to remain a socialist nation (or to evolve into a nondemocratic nationalist regime), to be beset with

internal troubles, and to be hostile to Germany's reunification as well as the pro-EC stances of Poland and Czechoslovakia. As a result, stage D provides a 1-1/2 bloc European system that would find NATO facing a still-adversarial Soviet Union across a genuinely neutral or even pro-West buffer of East European states.

Would this stage allow NATO to cease planning for the contingency of a war with the Soviet Union? The answer is that any kind of smoothly launched Soviet attack on Western Europe probably could be largely dismissed from NATO's calculus. In essence, the Soviet Army first would have to subjugate Poland before attacking Germany. This would still be an alternative physically open to them that NATO would need to hedge against in its defense planning. As a result, NATO could afford to maintain a smaller posture (e.g., 20-27 divisions) deployed in Central Europe during peacetime. But it would need to retain a sufficient outside U.S. reinforcement capability to defend against whatever Soviet forces could be allocated to an attack on Germany, allowing for delayed arrival and sizable Soviet diversions to protect the lines of communication through Poland.

What about NATO's military strategy in stage E? The need for a regional security strategy under the CSCE's auspices would be even stronger in this system, although the likelihood of a major military clash with the Soviet Union would be considerably less than in stage D. An important issue would be NATO's need not only for a defense strategy that shields alliance members against an unexpected reversal, but also for a strategy that allows members individually to meet whatever obligations grow out of participation in a CSCE architecture spanning all of Europe. The requirements of Europe-wide collective security would create pressures for some form of Western contribution to be unavoidably drawn from NATO's forces.

It is impossible to determine where this leaves NATO's defense requirements in stage E. However, NATO would want to retain a fairly sizable conventional posture in Central Europe. At a minimum, NATO's forces would need to be large enough to send a deterrent signal to the Soviets and to protect Germany in the event of a crisis. Western forces also would need to be able to carry out their CSCE obligations. As an estimate, a deployed NATO force of some 18-25 divisions—roughly 40-55 percent of today's forces, but at reduced readiness—would probably be needed. This posture would be sufficiently large to undertake substantial military operations in any foreseeable crisis, and it would provide a solid foundation for mobilization and reinforcement from the United States in the event of suddenly deteriorating conditions in Europe.

Even if the Soviet Union could not pose a direct conventional threat to Western Europe, it still would possess ample long-range nuclear forces to destroy Germany and other NATO allies from the USSR. To deter this threat and reduce the potential for blackmail, NATO would still require extended U.S. nuclear deterrent coverage, sufficient U.S. nuclear forces deployed in Western Europe, and an American SACEUR to achieve coupling. In summary, NATO's total requirements for stage E would include conventional forces large enough to handle whatever regional security commitments are accepted, to mount a later-building forward defense and provide a hedge against a Soviet resurgence, coupled with adequate nuclear forces to balance the residual Soviet nuclear threat. This is a substantially smaller, less costly posture than that of today, but not a militarily insignificant one.

Table 4 displays the threat profiles and illustrative planning scenarios that NATO would continue to face in stages B, C, D, and E for a Soviet attack. The total Soviet force commitment of about 60 divisions in each stage represents the likely number that could be assembled after a CFE drawdown, given defensive requirements on other fronts (e.g., the Sino-Soviet border). The dimensions of the Soviet military threat to NATO recede steadily as Europe passes from one stage to the next in each case.⁷

Table 4

FUTURE EVOLUTION OF THE SOVIET/WARSAW
PACT MILITARY THREAT, 1990-2005

| System | Stage | | | | |
|------------------|-------|-----------|------|-------|-------|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Soviet divisions | 60 | 27+35 | 60 | 60(-) | 60(-) |
| NSWP divisions | 30 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total | 90 | 40/75 | 60 | 60(-) | 60(-) |
| D-day | M+30 | M+30/M+45 | M+45 | M+60 | M+60 |

⁷Planning scenarios are commonly used to develop NATO military requirements. They are not a prediction of future events, but rather an analytical and heuristic device for evaluating budgetary and programmatic alternatives. They are usually based on conservative assumptions that postulate a plausible downturn in political relations culminat-

Stage A: Classical Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on West Germany launched after 15-30 days of mobilization.

Stage B: Post-CFE scenario, Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces launch a 40-75 division attack in Germany between M+30 and M+45.

Stage C: "Hollow" Warsaw Pact scenario after virtually complete Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. Soviet forces reenter forward areas for attack on West Germany, but Poland remains neutral.

Stage D: "Dismantled" Warsaw Pact scenario, in which East European nations have withdrawn from the Pact. Soviet forces are presumed to reenter forward areas for attack through Poland on a reunited Germany, but must withhold several divisions for LOC/rear area security against sporadic East European resistance.

Stage E: "Collective security" system in which NATO's forces are sized for local contingencies that could escalate into a confrontation with the USSR.

DISMANTLEMENT OPTION 3: ALTERED TRANSATLANTIC BARGAIN

This option involves a formal revision of the Transatlantic Bargain and the Paris Agreement of 1954. The result would be adoption of a division of labor philosophy in which the West European nations would assume responsibility for continental defense. The United States would largely withdraw from the continent, afterward providing only sealane defense and strategic nuclear deterrence. At issue is whether and to what degree NATO could safely move to this plateau under the conditions that would prevail in stages B through E.⁸

Table 5 displays present NATO capabilities in ground forces; Table 6 displays likely NATO force requirements for these stages. For stages B and C, the "early" requirement displays force needs for a forward defense at the German border against the threat that is likely to be available within the first month or so, with units drawn from Soviet forces in the forward areas and the western military districts. The

ing in a war that places stressful demands on NATO's posture. In all likelihood, the risk of war in Europe will decline in future years, relative to the risks of the Cold War period.

⁸For a detailed analysis of burden-sharing trends in NATO, see Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, *Report on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, Washington, D.C., 1989.

Table 5
CURRENT DIVISION-EQUIVALENTS (DEs)
IN CENTRAL EUROPE

| | Available Early (M+30) | Available Late (M+60-90) |
|----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| West European allies | 34 | 0 |
| United States | 11 | 15 |
| Total | 45 | 60 |

Table 6
NATO'S FORCE REQUIREMENTS
(DEs)^a

| | Stage B | Stage C | Stage D | Stage E |
|-------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| Early | 36-40 | 26-30 | 20-27 | 18-25 |
| Later | 50-55 | 43-47 | 37-40 | 32-35 |

^aFor stage C, readiness requirements are lower than at stage B.

"later" requirement measures needs against a threat that also draws on an estimated 25 Soviet divisions from other military districts: the likely amount available after CFE-mandated force cuts, taking into account Soviet defensive requirements on other fronts (e.g., the Sino-Soviet border). For stage D, the "early" requirement is based on force needs for maintaining NATO's internal unity, dealing with local contingencies, and projecting an image of military strength. The "later" requirement is based on the contingency of a 60-division Soviet attack against Germany, after passing through Poland, assuming some Soviet forces would have to be withheld to secure the lines of communication through Poland and Czechoslovakia against partisan activity. For stage E, requirements reflect a regional political-military calculus with the dominant contingency being a local crisis that could escalate into a confrontation between the USSR and NATO joined by selected East European forces.

These two tables suggest that even assuming no allied reductions are taken as part of the CFE drawdowns, the West European nations would be hard-pressed to defend Central Europe at stage B in the

absence of a sizable U.S. contribution. This is marginally the case in relation to early requirements and is decisively true for later requirements. In stage C, the allies would be able to meet early requirements but not later needs. In stages D and E, present West European forces would be solidly capable of defending themselves early, and marginally capable later.

The tables also suggest that as early as stage B, NATO could begin moving in the direction of an altered division of labor in Europe by allocating reductions in favor of U.S. forces (both currently deployed and rapid reinforcement units). In the case of no allied reductions in CFE, for example, the early U.S. contribution could be scaled back from 11 DEs now to six divisions for a total 40-division requirement. Assuming six U.S. divisions are provided early, the later U.S. contribution could be reduced from 15 DEs now to 12 divisions for fulfilling a posture goal of 52 divisions. In stage C, the U.S. early contribution could be almost completely eliminated, and the later contribution could be reduced to 8-12 later-arriving divisions.

As Table 7 shows, these changes could produce a substantially altered U.S. role in NATO's defenses in Central Europe. In this concept, which takes the division of labor philosophy to its logical extreme, the present U.S. early contribution first is cut in half and then is completely eliminated. The later-arriving U.S. contribution is similarly cut. The total U.S. force requirement drops from 26 divisions to only five divisions by stage D and to none after that. This clearly would permit not only an overall U.S. reduction, but also a major,

Table 7
FUTURE DIVISION OF LABOR^a
(DEs)

| | Current Posture | Stage | | | |
|----------------|--------------------|-------|----|----|----|
| | | B | C | D | E |
| West Europeans | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 | 34 |
| United States | | | | | |
| Early | 11 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Late | 15 | 14 | 9 | 5 | 0 |
| Total | 26 | 18 | 9 | 5 | 0 |

^aForce levels for fully meeting NATO's postulated requirements at the high end and minimum U.S. contribution assuming maximum shift of responsibility to West European nations.

perhaps total, ground and air drawdown in U.S. forces now deployed in Europe.

The feasibility of moving so decisively in this direction, however, must be evaluated in light of the many practical and political constraints that do not appear in these tables, which assume that the West European allies would be willing to forsake any peace dividend in stage B and beyond even though the U.S. contribution and the Warsaw Pact threat are being greatly scaled back. The implications of an allied failure to follow this course need to be factored into the equation. In this context, Table 8 displays NATO's residual capabilities in relation to requirements, assuming allied cuts of 50 percent in stage B. The table suggests that sizable allied drawdowns would negatively affect on NATO's security in all stages. In stage B, NATO's early defenses would be left well short of meeting requirements for a forward defense; even after a complete buildup, its later defenses would fall well short of requirements for containing the postulated Soviet threat. Thus, the division of labor concept cannot be successfully pursued in the absence of allied willingness to maintain their forces at fairly high levels. Reductions along the lines of a CFE phase 1 agreement (10 percent allied cuts) would be feasible, but not much more. A similar situation would apply in stage C. Marginal allied cuts would not be decisively harmful, but deep cuts would leave NATO vulnerable both early and late. The situation would be better in stages D and E, but

Table 8

NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE AFTER ALLIED CUTS
(DEs)

| | Stage | | | |
|----------------------|-------|-------|-----------------|-------|
| | B | C | D | E |
| West European forces | 17 | 17 | 17 ^a | 17 |
| U.S. forces | | | | |
| Early | 6 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Late | 12 | 12 | 6 | 1 |
| Total capability | | | | |
| Early | 23 | 18 | 17 | 17 |
| Late | 35 | 30 | 23 | 18 |
| Total requirement | | | | |
| Early | 36-40 | 26-30 | 20-27 | 18-25 |
| Late | 50-55 | 43-47 | 37-40 | 32-35 |

^aAssumes 50 percent allied cut.

NATO's forces would still be marginally deficient in relation to requirements.

Whether the West European allies would pursue deep cuts of this magnitude is uncertain. Although purely national considerations probably would inhibit all from radically paring back their forces, however, at least a few nations (e.g., Belgium, the Netherlands, and Denmark) would seek a sizable peace dividend. Depending on the residual Soviet threat, this would put pressure on the remaining nations to increase their defense spending to offset the loss of forces from other nations and to remedy present deficiencies in modernization and sustainability. Also, other defense increases would have to be made. In compensating for the removal of U.S. air power (which contributes heavily to NATO's posture), allied tactical air forces would have to increase by 40-50 percent. The allies would also have to spend more heavily on command, control, intelligence, and communications. They would probably have to expand their infrastructure in areas where they now rely on the United States as well, and to expand their defense industrial base to accelerate production of their own weapons. They could partly offset these increases by paring back their naval forces. Nonetheless, the total budgetary increase could be daunting: possibly on the order of 25-50 percent over present budgets.

As a practical matter, this step would become militarily feasible only if the alliance was prepared to see a considerable expansion of German military forces beyond the limits set by the 1954 Treaty of Paris. At a minimum, deployment of an additional 4-5 German divisions and 300-400 tactical combat aircraft would be necessary. Whether the German government would be enthused about this step is uncertain. Equally important, the reaction of other governments—East and West—would be problematic. A German military buildup of this magnitude would make Germany the dominant military power in Central Europe, well beyond the forces of the United States, France, and other nations. In all probability, this development would create frictions of its own, especially in the context of other political changes taking place simultaneously across Europe.

Even with a German buildup, the allies would need to integrate militarily in such areas as common doctrine, training, and operational procedures. Acquisition, procurement, and logistic support would have to be harmonized. The most fundamental changes, however, would be political. Germany would provide only about 50-60 percent of NATO's forces and could not protect Central Europe on its own. France would either have to return to NATO's integrated military structure or develop closer military relationships with the FRG and other allies through the WEU.

The path to allied self-sufficiency of this sort would require a greater degree of West European political integration than currently is envisioned as a result of the 1992 project. In essence, the West European nations would need to develop the capacity to perform full coalition planning largely in the absence of U.S. leadership. This step might require, for example, creation of a West European army that would enable the allies to pool their resources under a single European command structure. Previous attempts to move in this direction have met with little enthusiasm among West European nations. It is uncertain whether future efforts, conducted amidst the withdrawal of U.S. forces, would suffer a similar fate. Possibly the European nations would feel sufficiently comfortable with the idea of this advanced form of integration to pursue the task. But equally likely, sovereignty would exert its familiar negative force.

Nuclear considerations would pose further barriers to adoption of this kind of division of labor. Although the continental allies (minus France) currently possess nuclear delivery systems, nuclear warheads are kept under U.S. control. In the new arrangement, these warheads presumably would have to be transferred to allied ownership. The United States theoretically would be called upon to continue providing extended nuclear deterrent coverage over Western Europe. Whether the continental allies would continue implementing MC 14/3 to a sufficient degree to satisfy the United States would be uncertain. As likely as not, these nations could be expected to fall back on a more nuclear-oriented strategy in ways that could unnerve the U.S. government.

Necessary adjustments in command arrangements would probably cause further strains in transatlantic relations. In particular, difficult issues would arise over the SACEUR position, which controls the military judgments on which the decision to escalate would be based. The United States would no doubt be reluctant to turn over this important position to a West European officer as long as American strategic nuclear forces are committed to NATO's defense plans. The West Europeans, for their part, might very well be unwilling to continue being commanded by an American officer in the absence of a large U.S. force on the continent. A compromise solution might involve creation of separate NATO nuclear and conventional commands under an American SACEUR, but such a solution would leave neither side satisfied.

Developments like these, magnified by the withdrawal of U.S. forces, would almost inevitably trigger not only American misgivings but also serious allied questions about the U.S. nuclear commitment. As a result, pressures would grow to develop an independent West European nuclear pillar, anchored on larger British and French forces and a

separate targeting doctrine. Whether the West European nations would be politically capable of taking this step is uncertain. But if they did take it, the continuation of the present U.S. nuclear commitment would be called into question within the United States. The consequences are uncertain, but political interactions might seriously weaken the transatlantic connection that is one of NATO's most important foundations.

The trends at work in Western Europe suggest that without a major revision in NATO's military strategy, a wholesale shift to a NATO division of labor philosophy is unlikely to be politically, militarily, or economically feasible in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, partial shifts in this direction might well be possible and desirable if Europe passes through stages B through E. Currently, NATO's defense posture is not designed optimally; it suffers from the inefficiencies that tend to affect any alliance of numerous sovereign nations. The division of labor concept provides NATO an opportunity to help rectify this problem, if only marginally, by allowing the continental powers to concentrate on ground forces where they enjoy a comparative advantage over the United States. The United States could not only reduce its large ground commitment but also concentrate on air, naval, and nuclear forces, where it enjoys a comparative advantage. The result would be a more effective use of NATO's resources alliance-wide.

Although the West European allies are now hard-pressed to increase their defense spending, this problem should ease as their economies continue to grow with the impetus of the 1992 project. They might well be able to absorb many of the functions that U.S. forces now perform in Central Europe, permitting an even greater reduction of U.S. forces and allowing the United States to concentrate on its important function as a reinforcing nation. Especially given today's tensions over burden-sharing, it makes sense to gradually transfer responsibilities for defending Central Europe to the West European nations.

If this alternative proves acceptable in the context of larger changes in Europe, the United States might proceed down this path over a sustained period by first withdrawing one U.S. division and two air wings. Following this, withdrawal of another division, two brigades/regiments, and two or three air wings might be appropriate. This would leave behind a U.S. posture of a single corps, with two divisions and an armored cavalry regiment, along with three air wings, totaling about 150,000 men. These forces would be supported by reinforcing U.S. Army units and multiple air wings from the United States. Further drawdowns could be contemplated, perhaps to a single division and an equivalently small air presence in Germany, supplemented by deployment of a few small U.S. units to other West European countries. It

might be wise to halt the process there. Quite apart from their role in meeting NATO's overall force requirements, U.S. forces are needed in Europe for a host of political and military reasons bearing on the need to establish a visible U.S. presence. For this reason the United States clearly would be best advised not to leave Europe entirely. As an alternative, it might aim at reverting to the kind of military role that it now plays in Korea: of providing a smaller but politically important and militarily useful role in NATO's defense strategy.

DISMANTLEMENT OPTIONS 4 AND 5: ELIMINATING NATO AS A POLITICAL ALLIANCE

These two options would mark the final steps in dismantling NATO by eliminating NATO's organizational structure and the North Atlantic Treaty itself. The task of determining whether and when to take these steps is largely a matter of defining the political requirements for European security that would prevail in stage E of Europe's evolution. In that stage, the Soviet Union is presumed to have reformed to the degree that it no longer behaves as a major adversary of the West. In all likelihood, it would no longer be a socialist nation. Regardless of its internal configuration, it presumably would behave as a traditional European state that pursues its own vital interests and foreign goals but does not seek to dominate Europe and impose alien values on other nations. It would be unlikely to embark on any ideologically inspired foreign crusade, but in a crisis, it would not be immune to using force against its neighbors. At issue is whether any NATO alliance at all would be needed under these conditions. If NATO is needed, what kind of alliance should it be?

The best way to begin answering this question is to recognize that the absence of an ideology-inspired Soviet threat to the West does not mean that Europe would be free from tensions that could lead to war. Although the rise of totalitarianism after World War I brought a unique brand of strife to Europe, the continent's history before then was one of continual conflict and war. Russia under Czarist rule played a major role in producing this instability by pursuing traditional, often expansionist goals. Other nations succumbed to nationalist impulses, territorial ambitions, and crusades of their own. Germany was especially guilty of this from 1870 onward, but in earlier years France (among others) exhibited similar traits.

Throughout this turbulent history, the multipolar nature of Europe's security system, tenuously anchored on shifting alliances, failed to preserve stability. Indeed, multipolarity itself often was the cause of

instability. In a post-Cold War era, many of the old patterns are likely to resurface, especially if a similar multipolar system reappears. The economic and political dynamics of European life in the 21st century are likely to produce entirely new conflicts of their own: For example, a resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe could give rise to multiple political conflicts among the nations there. For these reasons, Europe is unlikely to remain stable unless some formal security architecture is created to maintain an equilibrium, establish rules and codes, and discourage aggression.

One of the most visionary ideas is that of expanding the 35-nation CSCE, after a formal peace treaty is signed, into a formal "collective security" system. Since this alternative in theory could supplant NATO, thereby permitting the alliance to be completely dismantled, it merits thorough appraisal and careful scrutiny of the West's vital interests. A CSCE architecture could be fashioned to support the West's security requirements and to help keep the United States involved in Europe's affairs. Yet it is worthwhile remembering that as early as 1954, the Soviets began advocating collective security schemes as a device to replace NATO. The West consistently rejected the idea because of fear that it would divide NATO, drive the United States out of Europe, and leave the continent vulnerable to Soviet encroachment. These same risks still need to be guarded against today.

The idea here is that a European collective security system would function along the lines originally envisioned for the United Nations. All participants would be joined by a treaty and by an institutional structure to pledge respect for each other's security interests. Explicit rules would govern the establishment and use of military forces, as well as other elements of national behavior. Violators would be punished under law by a collective response, and defense planning would be anchored not on the protection of specific borders but on punishing rule violators. In this way, stability would be fostered and aggression discouraged.

The critical issue is not the theoretical desirability of this idea but rather its practicability. The United Nations fell short of original aspirations for many of the same reasons that could weaken the effectiveness of any European collective security system. Although collective security schemes can help build and maintain order, they themselves do not automatically bring about stability. They tend to work best if they reflect an underlying, shared consensus on the proper political order, the distribution of material wealth, behavioral norms, and other factors. When these conditions exist, an enduring commitment to collective security is possible. When they fail to exist, commitments tend to prove transient, treaties become meaningless pieces of paper,

tensions surface, suballiances form, and promises of a collective response fade. In the end, collective security runs the risk of becoming a hollow architecture: Stability can wind up dependent on the balance of power and other traditional determinants of equilibrium. And if there is no balance, the security of weaker members can fall victim to the interests of the strong.

These caveats do not imply that a CSCE architecture could not help tame Europe's turbulent forces, but degree matters: The CSCE should not be regarded as a political cure-all. A collective security system is likely to work only if Europe is so ready for stability that major conflict among the participating nations has been rendered a thing of the past. It is unlikely to maintain order if it is imposed on an otherwise unstable Europe for the purpose of somehow dampening conflict, especially if one of the system's militarily strongest members is prone to violating the rules. Given that Europe today seems likely to be volatile even without an openly adversarial Soviet Union, a collective security architecture, even one built on the foundation of the CSCE, is unlikely to be a fully confident solution to Europe's security problems. It would neither create satisfactory barriers to the outbreak of war nor provide the West with an effective institutional mechanism for coalition planning if war does occur. If it did eventually fulfill its highest promises, at a minimum considerable time would be required for it to establish deep roots and for the continent to integrate further. At least in the interim, and perhaps longer, some other security architecture is also likely to be needed to supplement it.

One alternative to maintaining NATO is that of expanding the European Community into a genuine security alliance. In this scheme, stability in Europe would be achieved by establishing a united Western Europe as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, with a neutral Eastern Europe suspended in between. With Western Europe now capable of protecting its own security, the NATO organizational structure and the North Atlantic Treaty itself could be abolished. With NATO gone, U.S. military forces would depart and the formal security link between the United States and Western Europe would be severed. To the extent that a transatlantic alliance still existed, it would stem from an informal recognition of mutual interests rather than any formal guarantees.

Like the collective security concept, this idea must also be subjected to careful scrutiny in terms of its practicability. As discussed earlier, many impediments lie between the allies' coalition planning and building the required military forces that would be needed to counterbalance the Soviet Union. Western Europe's dependence upon extended U.S. nuclear deterrent coverage is a particularly daunting constraint, but the

high cost of conventional defenses is an imposing barrier itself. These alone would make the European Community at best a long-range solution to Western Europe's security needs rather than any early substitute for NATO.

Quite apart from the practicability of this idea, there is also the issue of its desirability. To the extent that the West European allies still depend on U.S. nuclear coverage, mutual interests would hardly be enough to make coupling credible. Contemporary history in Europe and the Far East (e.g., the U.S.-Japanese relationship) shows that a formal treaty backed up by a U.S. military presence is needed to establish nuclear credibility. Also, the healthy but often stressful U.S.-West European economic relationship would be hard-pressed to survive in the absence of a transatlantic alliance. Growing economic strains could drive the former partners into opposing blocs with security frictions of their own.

Equally important, the United States has legitimate security interests of its own in Europe (including physical survival in the event of a nuclear war) that entitle it to a strong voice in Europe's security councils. It would not have a degree of influence commensurate with its European and global responsibilities if either the CSCE or the EC became the West's sole security institutions in Europe. A strong voice would most directly serve American interests, but it also would serve the interests of the West Europeans, the Soviet Union, and other European nations by discouraging a resurgence of American isolationism. History shows that a strong U.S. presence in Europe is a stabilizing influence there, whereas the absence of the United States encourages disruptive trends. It is useful to remember that World Wars I and II occurred in part because an isolationist United States failed to intervene in time to prevent catastrophe. What is past can be prologue.

These considerations argue for the continued existence of NATO as an active political alliance, even if its military dimension is sharply reduced. This is likely to remain the case for as long as security and stability in Europe remain demanding goals to be achieved, rather than conditions of nature. In the short term, this political role would call on NATO to continue deterring Soviet aggression and to help the West guide the process of change and reform in Eastern Europe. In the medium term, it would require NATO to help the West develop its positions in the CSCE and translate them into codes of conduct that protect the West's security interests. In the long term, NATO's political role would call for the alliance to bind the United States tightly to Europe, to preserve the transatlantic connection, and to provide the West a still-important military security umbrella of its own, which

would continue to function even as the CSCE develops, the EC grows stronger, and an effective collective security system emerges.

As NATO becomes an increasingly political alliance, its organizational structure will be altered to include such functions as monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, pursuing confidence-building measures, and developing linkages with the CSCE and the EC. Throughout, military forces and coalition planning will remain essential elements of its structure. For this reason, a military organization, with appropriate headquarters staffs, will continue being needed, even if in substantially different form than it is today. For example, it is conceivable that a NATO organization will still be commanded by an American SACEUR, but with an all-European forward defense command, a U.S. reserve command, and a separate nuclear command. Other variations are possible. All would be quite different from today's structure, but each would leave NATO with an integrated military organization.

Eventually, the conditions justifying NATO's complete dismantling might emerge if Europe fully stabilizes to the point where a Concert of Europe could achieve permanent stability, and a formal transatlantic security tie is no longer needed to bind the United States and Western Europe together. This state of affairs, however, is likely to be far off in the distant future, if it occurs at all. Indeed, it is equally likely that it will prove beyond the reach of diplomacy to transform the CSCE from a conference that regulates conflict between two opposing blocs into a full-fledged collective security architecture. In that event, NATO itself might serve as an effective substitute, one with a hard-won, already established foundation that could be expanded upon to include not only other West European nations, but also the East European nations and even the Soviet Union.

This idea might seem improbable in light of NATO's role in the Cold War and its domination by the United States. But NATO is a highly flexible alliance that can accommodate new members as well as an altered internal balance of power and new roles in Europe and elsewhere. It is useful to remember that in 1947 the West invited the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to join the Marshall Plan, NATO's economic forerunner. The Soviet Union itself offered to join NATO in 1954, although on terms not acceptable to the alliance. An invitation conceivably could be re-extended to a democratic Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and it is not beyond imagination that it might be accepted. As Gorbachev himself has remarked, the coming international security system is likely to demand a working relationship among the United States, Europe, and the Soviet Union. NATO might not be ideal for this purpose, but it might be the only workable option for all potential participants.

V. THE PATH TOWARD A MORE POLITICAL, LESS MILITARY NATO ALLIANCE

Although it is possible to identify conditions under which NATO safely could be dismantled, the act of doing so illustrates why this alliance is likely to live on. NATO could be completely dissolved if the Soviet Union were to become an entirely benign nation, if Europe were to achieve such a high degree of consensus that war became unimaginable, and if the transatlantic relationship no longer required an alliance to cement it. These conditions are not beyond the realm of possibility, but they are unlikely anytime in the foreseeable future. Until they come about, the premature dissolution of NATO could unleash forces of instability in Europe. NATO's dismantlement, at worst, could produce a multipolar system there, with the United States having returned to isolationism, the Soviet Union pursuing an expansionist policy, and a neutral Germany divided from Britain and France. History shows that this system would be prone to tension and disorder. To prevent this deterioration and to guide Europe through the dangerous times ahead, NATO will need to remain as a foundation of the West's security policy for some time.

The road ahead calls not for wholesale dismantlement but rather for NATO to undergo a steady transition from its present mainly military orientation to a more political alliance. This will permit NATO to shed some of the trappings of the Cold War by partly dismantling, especially its military forces. But it does not mean that the proper Western response to an increasingly hollow Warsaw Pact is an equivalently hollow NATO: That development would produce a power vacuum and the very instability that must be avoided. NATO needs to remain internally united and to preserve a coherent military strategy, albeit at lower force levels than now. Rather, the concept of a more political alliance means that NATO should broaden its focus beyond its present preoccupation with containment and deterrence at the inter-German border. NATO increasingly should adopt a security policy that responds to the receding of Soviet military power behind the USSR's borders by endeavoring to preserve a stable European equilibrium. This policy will require the preservation of substantial NATO military strength, but its core feature will be an active, adept diplomacy and overall security policy that balances the security interests of the West, the Soviet Union, and other European nations. In addition, NATO will need to take its place, along with a growing CSCE and European Community, as one element of a larger security architecture.

The West must adopt a policy based on pragmatic aims rather than ultimate visions, one that is preoccupied with managing the power of still-competing nations rather than banishing political conflict altogether from Europe's face. Given Western interests and the trends at work in Europe, the West would seem best advised to direct its attention to determining how to manage the transition of the European security system from its present state to stage D, the 1-1/2 bloc system. That is, the West's policy should aim at fashioning stability out of a system that includes:

- The entire withdrawal of Soviet military forces behind the USSR's borders, but a Soviet Union that remains a potentially adversarial power.
- Reunification of Germany, with continued membership in NATO.
- The eventual withdrawal of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and other East European nations from the Warsaw Pact.

The task of merely getting from stage A to stage D will be difficult enough. As an illustration of how old patterns are breaking down, the last few months have seen the United States encourage the Soviet Union to intervene in Romania on behalf of an anti-Bolshevik revolution followed by a Soviet request for Western intercession aimed at discouraging the Baltic states from leaving the USSR. The years ahead are likely to be even more fluid. Essentially, managing the transition to stage D will require taking the major step toward Germany's reunification even as the Soviet Union parts company with the security buffer that has been a central feature of its policy since World War II. Since this step is laden with historical meaning, it will not be achieved easily or without adroit diplomacy; many roadblocks will have to be overcome and pitfalls avoided. Once stage D is achieved, the task of maintaining the new system's stability will be equally difficult. This system could be prone to tension as Germany's stature increases and as Western influence spreads into Eastern Europe through the EC's growth and other dynamics. Tension will be further exacerbated if, as is possible, the Soviet Union finds itself beset with internal troubles, a stagnant economy, a sense of outside encirclement, and fears for the future. Although the exact consequences are hard to foretell, these characteristics do not add up to tranquil times ahead in a stage of Europe's evolution that could last for several years.¹

¹For an analysis of alternative approaches to handling East-West relations, see Arnold Horelick, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Threshold of a New Era," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 69, No. 1, 1990.

What are the implications for NATO? Should NATO remain at the forefront of the West's efforts to guide Europe toward stage D? Or could the West use other institutions, especially the CSCE and the European Community, for managing Europe's evolution, thereby permitting it to relegate NATO to the backwaters of its diplomacy? A partial answer is that if the transition to stage D is to be managed successfully, the CSCE clearly will have to acquire a larger capacity to regulate the military forces and diplomatic conduct of all participants. But the CSCE itself is likely to grow only in a slow and steady way and its effectiveness to be shaped by how much underlying consensus there is in Europe. Short of a political accord that accepts the new security system as legitimate, the CSCE alone is not a workable solution. Nor is it possible for the West to rely entirely on the European Community, which is an economic and political institution rather than a security alliance. Accordingly, the West will need to retain and actively employ NATO as the primary institutional vehicle for implementing its security policy.

There are five security requirements for safely achieving stage D and then ensuring this system's stability. These requirements call for a cohesive, diplomatically active NATO. The first is that the pace of change in Europe should be controlled, if possible, to orchestrate events. An overly rapid tempo, unanticipated shocks, or an unmanaged sequence of changes could undo the entire effort. In particular, the current rush to German reunification followed quickly by premature Polish and Czechoslovakian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact could trigger a Soviet military clampdown that might lead to a Soviet-NATO confrontation. The events of 1989 suggest that political change in Europe might well outpace the emergence of new security institutions and structures to contain it. At least until there is an alignment between new realities and new architectures, NATO will be needed to help preserve a stable security system. In the meantime, NATO-directed diplomacy balancing pressures for change with Europe's ability to accommodate it will be essential for a successful transition.

A second requirement is the pursuit of properly coordinated policies that work together to open the way to further progress. The West's goal, acting through NATO, should be to facilitate the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Eastern Europe without entering into arrangements that unacceptably harm the West's own interests. This will require a sense of patience and perspective on the West's part, as well as keeping a careful eye on concessions made and precedents set in any one diplomatic forum. In this regard, there are grounds for questioning whether the CFE negotiations should continue to play a central role in the West's security policy after a CFE-I accord is achieved. Their

original purpose was to bring down Soviet/Warsaw Pact force levels to achieve a more stable military balance in the ATTU region, especially to reduce the threat of a Soviet surprise attack in Central Europe. While this goal remains valid, CFE was anchored on two premises, neither of which is likely to be valid in the years ahead: that the Warsaw Pact will remain cohesive and that substantial Soviet forces will remain in Eastern Europe. Given the revolution in Eastern Europe, the task now at hand is not one of limiting Soviet military power there, but rather of removing it entirely. Paradoxically, a CFE-II accord could undermine this objective by appearing to legitimize a continued Soviet military presence of some sort, especially in East Germany. At a minimum, CFE negotiations beyond phase I will need to be conducted with this goal in mind.

A third requirement for a successful transition is an acceptable solution to the German "problem." Although the interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other nations must be protected, Germany's legitimate needs must be respected too. It is apparent that the drive to unification is an irreversible political and moral imperative, one that has been an acknowledged Western goal for many years. The Four Powers currently retain their legal rights in Berlin and Germany, but these rights are unlikely to remain unchanged as momentum for reunification builds. Regardless, unification, on terms that alter arrangements for governing Germany, must be allowed to come to an internally satisfactory conclusion if Germany is to support the future security system. This is an essential ingredient for a stable order in Europe.

Debate over reunification began intensifying in the aftermath of Kohl's 10-point speech, which, for all its controversy and ambiguity, evidently was intended to lay out a responsible FRG position on the matter. Kohl called for increased FRG assistance to the GDR and growing economic ties in the short term. Over the long term, he envisioned a confederation leading eventually to a single nation. He left unclear Germany's future role in the European security structure. The Soviet Union immediately objected to the Kohl plan and particularly denounced any implication that the GDR would disappear or that a reunited Germany could remain within NATO. Shortly afterward, the four-power control commission for Berlin met and issued a cautionary statement underlining its rights in determining Berlin's future. In a similar vein, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called for a slow reunification process, lasting 10-15 years, that would be consummated only after substantially greater West European integration and accommodation with the Soviet Union have taken place. Speaking for the United States, President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker put forward four principles for reunification:

1. Self-determination without prejudice to the outcome.
2. Reunification within the framework of NATO and the European Community.
3. Reunification through a step-by-step process.
4. German respect for present international borders.

Gorbachev's dramatic endorsement of reunification in late January 1990 propelled developments a giant step forward. As he acknowledged, the issue no longer was whether the GDR would survive as an independent state, but whether, and in what circumstances, reunification would occur. The weeks of February 1990 found steady Soviet backpedaling on Gorbachev's conditions of January. The result was agreement to initiate "six-power" talks (the two plus four formula) about reunification on terms that seemed likely to give the Soviets less than they had originally demanded, including German withdrawal from NATO. At the same time, however, a broad European consensus seemed to be emerging on two points: that NATO's forces should not enter East Germany after unification and that a unified Germany should be embedded in a larger security architecture that preserves stability.

Meanwhile, events within Germany itself are propelling both states toward reunification within a shorter time period than outside powers would prefer. The tearing down of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the border blurred what already was an unnatural frontier between the two states. In turn, the mass exodus of East German citizens to the West is compelling the FRG to pursue economic policies aimed at bolstering the GDR's struggling economy. Common economic policies and a common currency lie ahead. Formal political discussions already have begun, and the GDR's move to free elections has led to the establishment of political parties there strongly resembling their FRG counterparts. The pace of change in both Germanies seems to be making unification, *de facto* and *de jure*, inevitable within a very short order.

The rapid march to reunification gives rise to the question of whether Germany should remain as a member of either bloc. Although a German withdrawal from NATO is one feasible solution that some will prefer, and Soviet diplomacy is likely to continue maneuvering for, the West's interests and Europe's stability would be far better served if the new Germany were to remain a member of NATO. Germany's withdrawal from NATO would result in a serious, perhaps fatal, weakening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Germany's nuclear requirements could not readily be met by U.K. and French forces, especially since withdrawal from NATO would weaken Germany's ties with those nations as well as the EC's cohesion. Short of the speedy (and

unlikely) creation of a West European military alliance to replace NATO, Germany would be compelled to develop its own nuclear deterrent and to pursue an independent foreign policy and defense policy course aimed at buffering itself against the Soviet Union. The result would be the kind of political tensions that could make stage D an unmanageable system. Continued membership in a still-cohesive NATO is needed to enable Germany to continue pursuing a responsible course, to preserve the West's unity, and to reassure the Soviet Union. It thus seems to make sense for all participants.

In theory, Germany could remain a member of the Atlantic Alliance while withdrawing from its integrated military structure. This step, which would mimic France's action in 1966, has been endorsed by some as an option for retaining the benefits of German membership in NATO while simultaneously reducing the costs of participation and reassuring the Soviet Union. When the full implications are considered, however, the surface appeal of this concept wanes. Unlike France, Germany is a frontline state that would become immediately involved in the event of East-West hostilities. For this reason, Germany's military requirements are more immediate than those of France. They could not credibly be met without coalition planning and an integrated military structure that directly ties German military operations to those of other alliance members, especially the United States.

Even if the Soviets fail to induce German neutrality in exchange for their own military withdrawal, Germany's own internal politics and visions conceivably could lead that nation to begin disengaging from NATO. Much will depend on whether the Soviet Union remains a salient military threat and whether NATO itself is adjusted in ways that accommodate future German priorities. While space does not allow this possibility to be evaluated in detail, there is no doubt that a German withdrawal would fundamentally alter NATO's role and create pressures for the development of a different European security structure than envisioned here. Possible options include an expanded role for the CSCE, a bilateral U.S.-German security alliance, and the reinvigoration of the WEU in ways that would strengthen Germany's defense ties with its West European neighbors. This complex issue is a topic for a separate analysis and deserves thorough evaluation.

A fourth requirement for stability is that a reunited Germany must pose no threat to Poland and Czechoslovakia. The transition of the Warsaw Pact from a hollow alliance to complete dismantlement must be accompanied by appropriate security guarantees to these nations regarding Germany's military forces and the preservation of present borders. By embedding Germany in the West on terms making

possible moderate behavior by that nation, NATO provides the best institutional framework for making such guarantees credible. Similarly, the Soviet Union will require appropriate reassurances, including guarantees that as Poland and Czechoslovakia are drawn into the EC's economic orbit, they will remain as genuinely neutral nations. The preservation of mutual defense treaties linking those two nations to the Soviet Union would help. Even so, guarantees from NATO ensuring that these two nations will refrain from security ties that could draw Western military forces toward the USSR's borders will be needed to induce Soviet military withdrawal and Soviet acceptance of the new security system. Anything less could stall the transition process, freeze it altogether, or give rise to a rebirth of the Cold War, with control over Poland being the issue at stake.

In a similar vein, Poland and Czechoslovakia, as presumably democratic nations with growing economic ties to the West, will require security guarantees against aggression from the Soviet Union, including treaties regarding reunification of force, respect for borders, and the maintaining of normal diplomatic relations. Each of these nations would have to retain sufficient military forces to protect their territory. Even with sizable national forces, however, both nations would remain within the shadow of Soviet military power. As a result, an extension of the West's security umbrella over them, under the CSCE and in some form that does not violate their neutral status, will be necessary.

Beyond doubt, the need for the West to reassure Eastern Europe poses troublesome implications for the stability of the 1-1/2 bloc system that will require careful diplomatic management. Any formal expansion of NATO's security orbit into Eastern Europe could be expected to provoke political difficulties with the Soviet Union. For this reason, NATO's touch in Eastern Europe will need to remain a light one. Individual Western nations acting unilaterally, within the CSCE and the European Community, will need to carry the lion's share of the load. An appropriate Western policy would call on NATO to remain in the background and to function only as an instrument of last resort.

A fifth requirement for a stable stage D is a more productive Western relationship with the Soviet Union. In this system, the Soviet Union (under socialist rule or otherwise) is still regarded as an adversary of the West. Degree matters greatly, however. An expansion of Western economic ties, along with appropriate security guarantees, would help give the Soviet Union a stake in maintaining the stability of this security system. Even in the best of circumstances, of course, the West will be able only to influence, not control, the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Much will depend upon the state of reform within the

Soviet Union. A backward, internally unstable USSR is more likely to be a malcontent than a nation that is making encouraging progress. The stability of stage D might well come to rest on whether reform succeeds in the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, the presence of a NATO alliance that responds to the USSR's legitimate security needs while deterring any Soviet resort to provocative behavior would help tilt the scales in the right direction.

The West will need a strong, politically cohesive NATO to help meet these five requirements for the creation of a stable 1-1/2 bloc system, allowing for democracy and freedom for the East European nations while preserving an equilibrium in Central Europe that all sides can accept as legitimate. In particular, NATO would be needed to maintain the West's unity, to coordinate its policy actions, and to anchor Germany in the Western community and encourage moderate German behavior. The Western allies also would be needed to help provide guarantees to the East European nations under the CSCE and to offer appropriate reassurances to the Soviet Union. In these ways, a more politically oriented NATO could help guide the European transition process through stages B and C, and then to help underwrite the European security architecture of stage D and beyond. No other institution in existence or likely to be created could perform these functions as well.

What implications does a Western policy aimed at using a still-cohesive NATO to help achieve a 1-1/2 bloc system pose for the all-important details of NATO's internal structure? And to what degree will the West be able to pursue the dismantlement options discussed above? Table 9 broadly illustrates how the West might guide NATO into becoming a less military, more political alliance over the coming years. It suggests how each of NATO's layers might be altered as Europe passes from one stage to the next. The idea here is that by changing NATO's structure on any one or more of these layers, a new, better attuned alliance can be created. In the process, unnecessary features can be cast off and appropriate adjustments made. The new alliance can be rendered capable of meeting the demands of the new situation in Europe in each case. NATO thus would become a dynamically evolving alliance itself, one that adapts itself intelligently to the changing scene in Europe.

The table outlines a path to change that substantially reduces NATO's conventional and theater nuclear forces as a function of arms control accords and political changes in the Warsaw Pact. By stage D, for example, NATO's conventional forces are cut by about one-half. Nonetheless, NATO retains sizable forces throughout these stages, including stage E. The reason is that despite large Soviet force cuts

Table 9

FUTURE EVOLUTION OF NATO, 1990-2005

| System | Stage | | | | |
|---|---------|---------|---------|-------|----------|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Layer 5 Altered military forces | | | | | |
| Theater nuclear posture | | | | | |
| Conventional posture (percent) | Present | Reduced | Reduced | Small | Symbolic |
| Deployed | 100 | 80-90 | 60-67 | 44-60 | 40-55 |
| Reinforced | 100 | 88-90 | 70-80 | 60-65 | 50-60 |
| Layer 4 Altered military strategy | | | | | |
| Extended deterrence | | | | | |
| Flexible response | | | | | |
| Forward defense | | | | | |
| Layer 3 Altered Transatlantic Bargain | | | | | |
| Gradual transition to greater allied role | | | | | |
| Slow U.S drawdown to small enduring presence | | | | | |
| Layer 2 Altered military organization | | | | | |
| Layer 1 Altered North Atlantic Treaty | | | | | |
| Remains in force at least until "Concert of Europe" emerges (post-2005) | | | | | |

Gradual scaleback to altered structure

and the eventual withdrawal of the East European nations from the Warsaw Pact, a large Soviet military threat remains. To balance this threat NATO would need strong military forces to maintain internal unity, project a peacetime image of strength in Europe, and guard against a downward turn of events, including Soviet violation of arms control accords. Also, the prospect of war with the Soviet Union, albeit improbable, could not be entirely dismissed. At stage D, NATO would need to continue to plan against the contingency of a Soviet reentry into Poland followed by an attack on Germany. Even in stage E, the West's role in maintaining a collective security system requires it to consider the possibility of helping East European nations defend against a Soviet attack on Poland. Therefore, NATO continues to face fairly demanding, if reduced, military requirements in the years ahead.

As indicated in the table, NATO's military strategy could be altered somewhat but not relegated to an unimportant position in alliance policy. The extended deterrence and flexible response parts of MC 14/3 would need to remain in force. The most important change envisioned here is a replacement of forward defense at the old inter-German border with a concept that also defends East Germany in wartime, accompanied by a growing emphasis on regional security missions. Like NATO's strategy today, this mission would require a capacity to respond to a broad range of crises as well as the ability to conduct a direct conventional defense and to escalate in a deliberate way. Thus MC 14/3, in its core features, would remain intact. Only the strategy's specific geographic emphasis would change.

Further, the table concludes that as the 1990s unfold, the West European allies could gradually assume a larger role in providing NATO's military forces by virtue of taking proportionately smaller cuts than U.S. forces. In the present stage A, the United States provides about 16 percent of NATO's peacetime forces in Central Europe and 45 percent of its fully mobilized forces in wartime. By stage D, as envisioned here, the U.S. contribution could shrink to about 10 percent in peacetime and 36 percent in wartime. A new division of labor would place a larger share of the burden on the shoulders of the increasingly prosperous allies. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces are never entirely withdrawn from the continent and the United States retains an important reinforcing role. Even in stage E, a symbolic force of one U.S. division and two tactical fighter wings remains deployed in Germany, and sizable forces in the United States remain oriented to Europe.

Finally, the NATO alliance, along with its integrated military organization, would remain in existence throughout. In stage D, NATO continues to provide the foundation for the West's security in the 1-1/2 bloc system, even as the European Community and the CSCE

grow in importance. In stage E, a less politically dominant NATO continues to exist as part of a collective security system, under the CSCE's auspices, in which a largely reformed Soviet Union is a responsible participant. The need for NATO perhaps might disappear only when the kind of "Concert of Europe" is achieved that renders war and political conflict too improbable to be taken seriously. But this is unlikely to transpire within the next 15 years, if then. Until then, NATO will need to be retained in somewhat altered form as an important instrument of the West's statecraft in Europe.

Table 10 provides an initial estimate of future ground and tactical air force requirements in Central Europe for the United States and the allies. These are purely illustrative estimates that require further detailed study. They provide estimates of the *maximum* number of force cuts that would be possible in each stage. For example, stage E's requirements are based on the assumption that the East European nations would help contribute to the cause of defending against Soviet aggression. In their absence, NATO's total force requirements could be some 10-15 divisions and 10-15 tactical air wings higher. Similarly, a larger Soviet threat than estimated here (60 divisions from stage B onward) or any East European support of Soviet aggression could further increase NATO's requirements. In both cases, requirements for U.S. forces as well as allied forces would be commensurately higher than envisioned here. With these important caveats in mind, this table provides conceptual insights on how far, in the best circumstances, NATO could safely afford to pursue this course of military dismantlement.

Table 10

**FUTURE EVOLUTION OF NATO'S MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
1990-2005**

| System | Stage | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| | A | B | C | D | E |
| Conventional posture^a | | | | | |
| Divisions | | | | | |
| Early | 45 | 36-40 | 26-30 | 20-27 | 18-25 |
| Late | 60 | 50-55 | 43-47 | 37-40 | 32-35 |
| TFW | 54 | 45-50 | 39-42 | 33-36 | 29-32 |
| Allied forces, Central Europe | | | | | |
| Divisions | 34 | 31-34 | 26-31 | 22-28 | 17-23 |
| TFW | 28 | 26-28 | 22-26 | 28-23 | 14-19 |
| U.S. presence | | | | | |
| Divisions | 3-1/3 | 4-1/3 | 3 | 1-2 | 1-2 |
| TFW | 8 | 6 | 5 | 3-5 | 2-4 |
| U.S. Reinforcements | | | | | |
| Divisions | | | | | |
| Early | 6 | 0-3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Late | 15 | 14-15 | 11-16 | 9-15 | 7-13 |
| TFW | 18 | 13-16 | 9-13 | 7-13 | 7-13 |
| Total U.S. contribution | | | | | |
| Divisions | 26 | 18-22 | 16-19 | 11-17 | 8-14 |
| TFW | 26 | 19-22 | 41-18 | 11-17 | 9-15 |
| Divisions of labor deployed (%) | | | | | |
| Allies | 84 | 87 | 89 | 90 | 94 |
| U.S. | 16 | 13 | 11 | 10 | 6 |
| Reinforced (%) | | | | | |
| Allies | 55 | 60 | 64 | 64 | 64 |
| U.S. | 45 | 40 | 36 | 36 | 36 |

^aRequirements for ground forces are based on tentative estimates of forces needed to execute MC 14/3 against the residual threat, employing standard "force-to-space" calculations and a desirable force ratio of less than 1.5:1.0 in the Soviet Union's favor. Requirements for air forces are based on the residual air threat, assuming that NATO's ground-air mix is not appreciably altered.